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Reflective Essay
History and the human experience are inextricably linked to the climate and ecology of our
planet. Often overlooked by modern-day contemporaries, infectious diseases have impacted
societies across the world for millennia. My paper, “Politics of Plague: Ancient Epidemics and
Their Impact on Society,” examines the four major plagues that wrought immense destruction
across the ancient Mediterranean world: the Plague of Athens (430 BCE), the Antonine Plague
(165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague (541 CE). The social,
political, economic, and religious changes caused by these epidemics were so severe and lasting
that they have led some scholars to conclude that their outbreaks ultimately contributed to the
downfall of the affected societies. My paper—the culmination of more than two months of
intensive research and analysis—makes a distinct contribution to existing scholarly research by
highlighting the reverberations of major epidemics throughout the ancient world. Moreover, my
analysis of these plagues and their impact on affected societies offers a thought-provoking lens
through which to consider our own circumstances amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
My research, which was independently undertaken as a Pomona-sponsored RAISE project
during the summer of 2020, was conducted primarily online. Sheltering at home, I journeyed deep
into the ancient world through the online portal of The Claremont Colleges Library, which granted
me access to a dazzling array of online databases, scholarly articles, scientific research, and
primary source translations. In a COVID-free world, I would have delighted in the opportunity to
spend my summer in the sunny tranquility of The Claremont Colleges Library’s solarium,
meandering between the stacks in pursuit of scholarly monographs and encyclopedias. However—
unable to access the library’s physical collection during the pandemic—my research became
confined to the digital realm. I began by compiling a preliminary list of primary and secondary
source materials for each ancient plague.
Based on the recommendation of my advisor (Pomona Prof. Benjamin Keim), the first
resource I consulted was L’Annee Philologique, a Classics bibliography database. In L’Annee, I
searched for keywords pertaining to each plague (e.g., the particular disease, and the names of
rulers, doctors, and other individuals contemporary) and recorded the citations for the various
ancient and modern texts it retrieved. After referencing L’Annee to create a preliminary list of
sources to investigate further, I utilized the general search engine on The Claremont Colleges
Library website to locate and download specific titles.
Before deciding whether to add any secondary source to the research notes used for
outlining my paper, I skimmed through each source to (1) evaluate the quality of the writing
(noting the author(s) and publisher, and observing the authors’ writing style), (2) assess the
author’s use of sources, and (3) establish its relevance to my research project. In the case of news
articles and sources retrieved through Google, it was necessary to employ particular scrutiny, as
they were unlikely to have been vetted to the same extent as articles retrieved through The
Claremont Colleges Library database. Specifically, I investigated: (i) how well-established a given
author was in their field, (ii) whether or not the work was published by a well-known university
press or publishing house, and (iii) how frequently the source had been cited by other authors.
Once I determined that a source was both reliable and relevant, I read it carefully, recording
important information and noting citations to other sources to examine in greater depth. Using my
library login, I also searched in JSTOR, Cambridge Core, Google Scholar, Britannica
Online, Digital Loeb Classical Library, Open Library of Humanities, and Oxford Research
Encyclopedias for plague-related keywords. These databases revealed a wealth of secondary
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sources to consult, allowing me to explore a vast array of topics—from analyses of Pericles’
political rhetoric to surveys of ancient coinage revealing agricultural and economic crises in the
2nd century Nile Delta.
The pandemic-induced limitations on other activities last summer provided me with an
unforeseen and unprecedented opportunity to engage with primary and secondary sources to an
extent that would not have been achievable during the school year alongside a full course-load. I
divided my research process and writing into six segments: the first week was dedicated to
familiarizing myself with the key facts relating to each plague and its aftermath; the following
eight weeks were devoted to examining each plague in more detail and writing about it
(approximately two weeks per plague); and the final two weeks were consumed with synthesizing
relevant information, reflecting on common themes and critical differences, and considering the
ramifications for our society amid the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Over the course of 11 weeks,
my RAISE project provided me with the fascinating opportunity to read, analyze, and immerse
myself in more than 100 sources, written by authors from a wide range of perspectives, places, and
periods—the bulk of which I was able to access through the online resources and databases of The
Claremont Colleges Library!
My research, writing, and analytical skills improved tremendously by being challenged
daily for more than two months. Examining maps, scholarly monographs, articles, and lectures
brought the ancient world to life. Poring over eyewitness accounts from politicians, scientists, and
clergy vividly describing each outbreak, I became lost in their universe. Their emotions and
experiences 1,500 to 2,500 years ago—loss, grief, and uncertainty—were reminiscent of
those encountered by humans today amid the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic. Synthesizing
the vast quantities of information I gathered into my paper consistently challenged me to identify
and distill the key insights and data from each source. It took multiple rounds of outlining and
editing to construct a narrative arc that describes the unique facts surrounding each ancient plague,
identifies common themes and critical differences among them, and reflects on parallels and
implications for our time. Despite the struggles I encountered, this experience has only confirmed
my excitement about pursuing a history major. I am proud of the final work product: a scholarly
research paper exceeding 100 pages that I plan to further develop and hope to submit for
publication.
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Abstract
The four major plagues that struck the ancient Mediterranean—the Plague of Athens (430 BCE), the
Antonine Plague (165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague (541 CE)—claimed
the lives of thousands, or even millions, of people. These epidemics impelled governments to fracture and
rebuild, induced the rise and fall of different religions and religious practices, altered military strategies and
outcomes, and forced ancient societies to re-examine their structures, values, and inequalities. Such
extreme mortalities profoundly impacted each affected society, triggering severe social, political, economic,
religious, and military changes that ultimately altered the course of history, and contributed to the collapse
of two of the ancient world’s greatest empires: Athens and Rome.
The Plague of Athens: For the first half of the fifth century BCE, Athens stood as the largest and most
cosmopolitan city-state in Greece. When Plague struck in 430 BCE, it took mere weeks for Athenian
culture and values to shatter, and for lawlessness and disorder to erupt. As Athens descended into chaos,
individuals capitalized on disaster to advance their personal and political interests. Social unrest,
demagogy, and political turmoil ensued. Moreover, by depleting Athenian manpower, the Plague
contributed to Athens’ defeat in the Peloponnesian War, a loss which significantly diminished Athens’
power across the Aegean.
The Antonine Plague: At the height of power in 165 CE, the Roman Empire was home to more than 75
million people and was one of the most prosperous civilizations the world had ever seen. The Antonine
Plague decimated towns and peoples across the Roman world, its spread amplified by urbanization, high
population density, and vast trade networks. It demolished Rome’s army: Roman triumph in the Parthian
campaign of 166 would be Rome’s sole military success for nearly 50 years. Economic struggles—initially
caused by the Plague’s death toll—precipitated agricultural crisis, prompting further economic decline.
Political strife, poor leadership, and frequent emperor turnover exacerbated unrest and uncertainty for the
future of the empire.
The Plague of Cyprian: Under the prudent leadership of rulers from the Severan Dynasty, the Roman
Empire slowly recovered from the Antonine Plague. Yet less than a century later, the Cyprian Plague
arrived, attacking its victims mercilessly and with little reprieve for nearly two decades. Rome’s economy
fluctuated wildly. Attempts at currency reform backfired, causing Rome’s silver currency system to crash.
With Rome’s military forces debilitated by Plague, the state faced enemies on nearly every frontier,
eventually losing hegemony along a number of fronts. In the 50 years following the outbreak of the Cyprian
Plague, Rome was ruled by more than 20 emperors. Barbarian invasions, economic decline, civil wars,
climate change, and the Cyprian Plague all played a role in what is referred to as the “first fall of Rome” at
the end of the third century CE.
The Justinianic Plague: After the Justinianic Plague spread across the Mediterranean world from 541-544,
it became endemic in the region, flaring up in various waves for the next two centuries. Worsening climate
conditions—including earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and a comet collision—resulted in agricultural
crises and famine. As recurring waves of plague and natural disaster reshaped the landscape of the empire,
traditional social order collapsed, giving way to hysteria. Ambitious programs of reform and military
conquest commenced prior to the outbreak of Plague had depleted the resources of the empire. Rome’s
military was greatly diminished by the Plague’s death toll and the state’s inability to pay its soldiers. Unable
to defend the frontiers of the empire against outside intruders, the Roman Empire was spliced into smaller
pieces which were claimed by various surrounding leaders.
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INTRODUCTION
The ancient Greek and Roman empires wielded immense power and controlled enormous
swaths of land and sea across the Mediterranean. These illustrious civilizations—and their
monumental advancements in technology, trade, culture, politics, and thought—have continued
to command the awe of humans living more than two millennia later. Many marvel at the great
texts of ancient authors, historians, and philosophers, as well as the remarkable achievements of
the ancient Greeks and Romans, ranging from naval ships and international trade routes to
agricultural advancements and urbanization. The legacy created by these civilizations and their
greatest minds has endured to today.
Often lost on present-day observers, however, is the extent to which daily life and the
human experience of the ancients differed from that of the modern era. One critical difference is
the extent to which life in the ancient world was riddled with infectious disease. Diseases such
as malaria, tuberculosis, measles, typhoid, leprosy, smallpox, bubonic plague, and other acute
diarrheal diseases were hyperendemic in many places. Studies in archaeology, economics, and
anthropology evince that the ancient Roman world “teemed with infection.”1 Due to the
frequency with which infectious disease—and other health conditions we now have the tools to
treat—claimed lives in the ancient world, the average life expectancy in the second century CE
was barely more than 20 years.2 While ancient Roman annalists acknowledged the ever-looming
possibility of a fatal epidemic,3 prior to the fifth century BCE most infectious diseases remained
endemic and were confined to limited regional areas, primarily afflicting populations in close

1

Hanna, “The Route to Crisis: Cities, Trade, and Epidemics of the Roman Empire,” 1.
Sheidel, “Roman Wellbeing and the Economic Consequences of the ‘Antonine Plague,’” 3-4.
3
Duncan-Jones, “The Impact of the Antonine Plague,” 109-110.
2
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geographical proximity to the disease pools. And, over time, many individuals began to develop
immunity to the diseases that commonly afflicted their area.
Outbreaks began to lose their geographic limitations in the mid-fifth century BCE. Under
the rule of ambitious leaders enamored with large-scale territorial conquest, accompanied by
technological innovation and increased trade, a greater number of individuals began to travel
further and further across the Mediterranean world than ever before. Alongside the soldiers,
diplomats, merchants, and goods traversing across the Mediterranean seas, traveled infectious
diseases. Infectious diseases that had previously been confined to particular areas were soon
introduced to non-immune populations across the empire, spurring severe epidemics on an
unprecedented scale. As commerce created abounding opportunities for jobs and wealth, trade
hubs near ports across the Mediterranean had become increasingly urbanized. Larger numbers of
individuals living in closer quarters than ever before also exacerbated the spread of infectious
disease.
Changing human travel and migration patterns and urbanization were not the only
ingredients that led to a few instances of particularly severe outbreaks of infectious diseases in
the ancient Greek and Roman world, beginning with the Plague of Athens in 430 BCE. While
often overlooked, the earth’s climate and ecology affect the core of the human experience, both
in ancient times and today. Different climatic epochs, fluctuating temperatures, volcanic
eruptions, and meteorites all affected the daily lives of people in the ancient world. Moreover,
such drastic climatic events caused “nature’s finely balanced ecosystem relationships [to]
change.”4 In response to changing climate conditions and changes in food availability, animal
species often adopted new and irregular migration patterns in search of food. Epidemics or

4

Heeney, “Ebola - The Plague of 2014/2015,” 14.
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epizootics (epidemics within an animal population, which, in some cases can jump from animals
to humans) can be caused by such sudden changes in animal behavior. It is estimated that nearly
75 percent of human infectious diseases originate from animals.5 Thus, while favorable climate
conditions aided the infrastructure and economic growth of ancient Greek and Roman cities,
changing climate conditions played a role in their undoing, as climate influenced the appearance,
frequency, and severity of infectious disease outbreaks. Human history operates on a changing
platform of nature, and climate variability throughout time has shown the power to either
stabilize or destabilize a given society.
The four major plagues that struck the ancient Mediterranean—the Plague of Athens (430
BCE), the Antonine Plague (165 CE), the Plague of Cyprian (250 CE), and the Justinianic Plague
(541 CE)—claimed the lives of thousands, or in some cases, millions, of people. Such extreme
mortalities profoundly impacted each affected society, triggering severe social, political,
economic, religious, and military changes that ultimately altered the course of history. These
epidemics impelled governments to fracture and rebuild, induced the rise and fall of different
religions and religious practices, altered military strategies and outcomes, and forced ancient
societies to re-examine their structures, values, and inequalities.
There are only a limited number of extant accounts of these ancient epidemics from
authors contemporary with such outbreaks. Deciphering the surviving fragments of ancient
writers’ work poses several challenges. First, ancient authors are notorious for their hyperbole,
prompting many modern historians to question whether or not their observations—particularly
their numerical estimates—should be taken at face value. Moreover, as their accounts were
originally written in Latin or ancient Greek, translating the authors’ accounts into English has

5

Heeney, “Ebola - The Plague of 2014/2015,” 11.
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also been difficult. Multiple interpretations exist for terms ancient authors used to describe
physical symptoms of a given disease, which has in some cases made it difficult for modern
scholars to identify the disease that caused a particular plague.6
Modern technology has greatly expanded our knowledge of the timeline, events, and
destruction caused by each plague. Archaeological excavations throughout the Middle East and
the Mediterranean have found Syrian villages nearly uninhabited after an earthquake and
outbreak of the Cyprian Plague, and unearthed papyri detailing census, taxation, and land
ownership data in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague in Egypt. In recent decades, DNA
analysis has helped to fill gaps in our knowledge and identify the particular disease responsible
for an outbreak. Using dental pulp of individuals buried in areas believed to have been afflicted
by disease, scientists have been able to run DNA analyses to test for the presence of a particular
virus or bacterium.7 Acquiring these ancient specimens poses its own challenge, as many mass
graves described in surviving historical records are located in or near major modern-day cities,
which often makes it difficult—if not impossible—to obtain permission to excavate these sites.
However, this technique has already been successfully employed in rural areas: in 2013,
scientists excavated a cemetery dating from the sixth century CE in Aschheim, Germany, and
found traces of the bacterium responsible for the Bubonic plague (Yersinia pestis), which
confirmed scholars’ theory that the Bubonic plague was the disease responsible for the
Justinianic Plague.
Our knowledge of these four major ancient epidemics comes from a variety of sources:
(1) ancient authors contemporary with the disease event, (2) ancient historians writing a few
centuries after the disease event, discussing the account of an author contemporary with the

6
7

Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 1-3.
Ibid, 2-3.
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outbreak, (3) archaeological findings, (4) paleomicrobiological findings, and (5) efforts of other
modern historians to synthesize the four aforementioned sources. It is thanks to this
collaborative and highly interdisciplinary effort that we now have a wealth of information
concerning the timeline, reach, and symptoms of each major epidemic, as well as the social,
cultural, religious, political, and military changes spurred by each.
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THE PLAGUE OF ATHENS (430 BCE)

Background
For the first half of the fifth century BCE, Athens was a force to be reckoned with. At its
height, the city of Athens stood as the largest and most cosmopolitan city-state in all of Greece,
controlling most of the Aegean coastline. While much of Athens’ energy and attention from 500
to 480 BCE was directed towards thwarting Persian attempts to invade Greece, the end of the
Persian Wars in 478 BCE marked the beginning of an era of Athenian dominance in Greece and
across the known Mediterranean. An important decision that contributed to Greek victory in the
Persian Wars was the formation of the Delian League, an association of more than 150 Greek
city-states scattered across the Aegean coast, that, under Athenian leadership, united to defeat the
Persians.
After peace had been made with Persia, what began as an alliance of independent Greek
city-states soon became a quasi-Athenian Empire. Athens took control of the League, continued
to collect hefty taxes from its member states, and relocated the League’s treasury from its
original location in Delos to Athens. Athenian politicians used the League’s funds to bolster
their city’s economy, funneling tax revenue into infrastructure projects, including the Athenian
Acropolis and the Parthenon.8 To the Spartans, a rival Greek superpower at the time, as well as
other members of the Delian League, it became increasingly clear that Athens was seeking to
consolidate power into an Athenian empire, and using the money it had collected to maintain its
status as the dominant naval power in Greece. In 431 BCE, Sparta and a number of its
Peloponnesian allies declared war on Athens, and the Peloponnesian War commenced. Given

8

Cartwright, “Delian League.”

12
the immense manpower and resources that Athens commanded, as well as its status as a naval
superpower, the city’s prospects for winning the Peloponnesian War appeared quite strong.9
After a successful campaigning season in Megarid, the Athenians finished the first year of the
war in high spirits.10 Having learned that Sparta planned to invade Attica, Athenian leader
Pericles sought to protect its citizens from possible attack. He moved many residents from the
suburbs into the city so that the Athenians would be protected within the confines of the
Themistoclean walls, which guarded the city and provided a fortified connection with the port of
Piraeus. Protected access to the port of Piraeus, which was located nine kilometers from the city,
would ensure that Athens could continue to access all the food and other resources it required for
those seeking shelter within city walls, while Athenian soldiers would be able to continue with
their naval campaigns against the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies. Every possible
scenario appeared to have been accounted and planned for. In a speech Pericles gave before his
soldiers, he confidently proclaimed that Athens was “ready to encounter every legitimate
danger.”11

Outbreak of Plague and Symptoms
While the measures implemented by Pericles and other Athenian leaders were effective in
protecting Athens from the enemy outside the Themistoclean walls, a more formidable threat
emerged from within the city’s walls. The Great Plague of 430 BCE was an unforeseen enemy
that the Athenians were unprepared to defeat. Widely believed to have originated in North
Africa, the plague arrived in Athens during the second year of the Peloponnesian War, first

9

Soupios, “Impact of the Plague in Ancient Greece,” 49.
Joho, “The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6–7,” 18-19.
11
Thucydides 2.6. This and all subsequent translations from Thucydides’ History are by Richard Crawley.
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striking the Athenian port town of Piraeus.12 The plague quickly found its way into the city of
Athens, where it spread like wildfire, suddenly attacking people otherwise believed to be in good
health. The Athenian leaders’ decision to pile residents from the suburbs into the city proved to
be a catalyst as it created living conditions conducive for person-to-person transmission. During
the Spartan siege, the city of Athens’ population is estimated to have tripled or quadrupled—
from 100,000-150,000 pre-war residents to 300,000-400,000 during the war, which resulted in a
very high population density (between 25,000 to 100,000 people per square mile) in Athens.13
The virgin soil epidemic attacked individuals regardless of age, sex, or race, and had a
mortality rate estimated between 25 and 33 percent.14 The only firsthand account of the plague
that has been recovered is that of the Greek historian Thucydides, a wealthy Athenian general
and political critic who was living in Athens while the plague ravaged the city, who fell ill to it
himself. According to Thucydides, the onset of illness was nearly immediate: healthy
individuals were “all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head,” and their eyes became
red and inflamed.15 These symptoms were soon followed by abnormally foul breath, sneezing,
and hoarseness, “after which the pain reached the chest,” producing a hard cough.16 Later, those
infected were overcome by an upset stomach, regurgitating bile “of all kinds,” and their skin
broke out into “small pustules and ulcers,” which left gnarly scars and marred the skin of those
who managed to survive.17 In many cases, the sick became unbearably hot, reporting sensations
of internal burning, and were unable to wear any clothing comfortably.18 Many were struck by
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Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 8.
Martínez, “Political Consequences of the Plague of Athens,” 139.
14
Mitchell-Boyask, Plague and the Athenian Imagination, 117.
15
Thucydides 2.7
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
13
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episodes of dementia.19 Approximately a week after contracting the disease, most infected
individuals experienced bouts of diarrhea, which severely dehydrated and weakened them.20
Often, it was this dehydration that weakened the sick and brought them to the brink of death.21
Many of those who managed to recover after this point experienced permanent brain damage and
memory loss.22

Modern Medical Assessment
Using modern technology and analytical tools, scientists in recent decades have sought to
identify the type of disease that ravaged Athens. They have concluded that bubonic plague,
typhoid fever, smallpox, measles, or endemic typhus are the most likely candidates. At present,
there remains some disagreement as to which of these diseases caused the Athenian plague.
Cheston B. Cunha and Burke A. Cunha suggest that the symptoms Thucydides described align
closely with measles or endemic typhus.23 It is important to note that the strain of measles that
would have struck Athens in 430 BCE is not the same strain present in modern societies, which
has become less virulent due to widespread vaccination.24 Among non-immune populations, the
mortality rate of measles approaches twenty-five percent, and the symptoms patients report are
similar to those described by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War. This theory
is supported by a measles outbreak that occurred on the Fiji Islands—home to a largely nonimmune population—in 1875, which killed an estimated 40,000 people.25

19

Ibid.
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 6.
24
Ibid, 7.
25
Measles & Rubella Initiative, “Fiji and Measles: From Devastation to Elimination.”
20
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Endemic typhus remains another likely possibility for the Athenian plague, as it can be
carried by lice, and historically has often struck during times when large populations were
crammed into confined spaces.26 According to the Cunhas, it is plausible that an individual with
endemic-typhus carrying lice may have entered Athens through the port of Piraeus and infected
the city.27 Robert J. Littman also believes that the Athenian plague most likely was caused by
endemic typhus. Using mathematical models, Littman and his team modeled each possible
infection and its infection rates to predict how long it would take each disease to spread through
a city like ancient Athens, as well as the duration for which it would likely remain endemic.28
From this study, Littman concluded that the plague likely was caused by typhus or a typhus-like
disease.29

Timeline and Mortality Estimates
The plague remained endemic in Athens for nearly five years: after its initial wave in
May of 430 BCE, it reappeared in 429, claiming the life of Greek leader Pericles, and then struck
for a third time in the winter of 427/6 BCE. The plague’s cumulative death toll is believed to be
between 75,000 and 100,000.30 The immediate effect of the plague on the Athenian way of life
was calamitous; it stretched the city’s resources thin, and killed the relatives, friends, and
acquaintances of many. Yet the longer-term consequences of the plague extended far beyond the
lives it claimed: the chaos, disorder, and social unrest that were triggered by the outbreak would
profoundly shape Athenian morals, religion, politics, and military conquest for decades to come.

26

Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 8.
Ibid, 8.
28
Littman, “The Plague of Athens: Epidemiology and Paleopathology,” 459.
29
Ibid, 459.
30
Mark, “Plague in the Ancient & Medieval World.”
27
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Social Changes
Mere months before the Plague struck Athens, Pericles gave his now-famed Funeral
Oration in honor of the Athenian men who had lost their lives fighting in the Peloponnesian War.
The entirety of Pericles’ speech has been recounted by Thucydides in History of the
Peloponnesian War. Before the largest Athenian army ever to be assembled in one body,31
Pericles praised the deceased soldiers’ bravery and loyalty to Athens, and emphasized the
greatness of Athenian culture, knowledge, and democracy that heralded Athens as a model for
the rest of the world. Pericles applauded the distinct traits admired, and values held, by Athenian
citizens, such as intelligence, resoluteness in action, belief in the equality of political rights, a
balance of private life with public duty, an appreciation of freedoms, and respect for authority.32
Highlighting the uniqueness of the Athenian constitution, Pericles proclaimed that “Our
constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than
imitators to ourselves.”33 Moreover, Pericles extolled that “Athens alone of her contemporaries
is found when tested to be greater than her reputation,” and that “the admiration of the present
and succeeding ages will be ours.”34 Thus, while respectfully offering his condolences and
honoring the men who valiantly fought for the glory of Athens, Pericles simultaneously touted
the hallmarks of Athenian values and conduct that enabled Athenian democracy to flourish and
serve as an inspiration for civilizations around the known world.
However, “almost in the same breath,” Thucydides evinced the fleetingness of the
Athenian ideals Pericles puts forth in his speech, for his account of the plague’s outbreak
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Joho, “The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6–7,” 18-19.
Ibid, 20.
33
Thucydides 2.6
34
Ibid.
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immediately follows his account of Pericles’ Funeral Oration.35 The ferocity with which the
plague attacked individuals regardless of age, sex, nationality, social status, or piety, suddenly
made life feel ephemeral. It did not spare the doctors or others who tried to help the sick. As the
plague traveled around the city like a wildfire, the mentality of the populace began to shift.
Many individuals began to neglect laws, religious rites, and proper burial practices, engaging in
reckless behavior without fear of consequences.36 As people died ubiquitously, the streets
became “strewn with heaps of homeless unattended dead and dying.”37 Men resolved to spend
their money quickly and cherish their last days, “regarding their lives and riches as things alike
of a day.”38 Thucydides wrote that “as the disaster passed all bounds, men, not knowing what
was to become of them, became utterly careless of everything, whether sacred or profane.”39
Widespread moral decline in Athens ensued, as individuals came to fear neither god nor law and
did not expect to live long enough to stand trial for their offenses.
More disconcerting, however, was the fact that the moral decay precipitated by the
outbreak of plague did not dissipate along with it. Modern scholars have argued that the plague
mounted a long-lasting “frontal assault on the Periclean ideal.”40 Law turned to lawlessness,
order was perverted to disorder, honor was nowhere to be found, and individuals ceased to act in
the interest of the greater public and instead began to act only in self-interest. The progressive
collapse of Athenian values in the years that followed was recounted by Thucydides in the third
book of his History of the Peloponnesian War, in which he described the “collapse of the three
fundamental Greek institutions: kinship, human law, and divine law.”41 His description of poor
35

Joho, “The Revival of the Funeral Oration and the Plague in Thucydides Books 6–7,” 16.
Christensen, “Plagues Follow Bad Leadership in Ancient Greek Tales.”
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Orwin, “Stasis and Plague: Thucydides on the Dissolution of Society,” 841.
38
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39
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leadership and declining values in the subsequent books serve as further evidence that the plague
had brought about a new Athenian environment and mindset that would ultimately unravel “the
spiritual tapestry of Greece’s greatest city.”42 The plague’s effective “demoralization of
Athenian society”43 was fraught with consequences: as J. F. D. Shrewsbury writes, “the
pestilence, in effect, engendered a social and political canker which continued to fester long after
the immediate effect of its morality had subsided.”44 Moral decay, fused with poor leadership,
exacerbated a multitude of civic problems in Athens. Divisions widened between the aristocracy
and working classes, old money and the nouveau riche, and traditional and “new” politicians.
Social conflict, class tensions, and an increased sense of nativism ruled the day. Arguably, the
only innocuous change that occurred in Athens as a result of the plague was a resurgence in
religion.

Religious Changes
Unlike many other historians of the ancient world, Thucydides did not offer a divine
interpretation of the plague. However, he did describe the impact on religion: as the plague
attacked both the pious and the nonreligious alike, many individuals gave up hope and stopped
praying to the gods. Thucydides observed that “the only increase in religious activity was the
popularization of the claim that the gods were punishing Athens with the disease,”45 as some
attributed the perceived immunity of the Peloponnese from the plague to Apollo’s promise to
assist the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War.46
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The Cult of Asclepius—the Greek god of medicine and healing—began to gain traction
in Athens during the plague and in the decades that followed. According to Robin MitchellBoyask, the increased popularity of religion and worship of Asclepius can be explained by
human response to tragedy—more specifically, the extreme loss of life from the plague which
Athens had failed to combat. He explains that “Just as tragedy encompasses both the optimistic
and pessimistic visions of death, so too does it give expression to the belief in both kinds of
medical therapy, the religious and the scientific.”47 While the Asclepius cult in Athens was
likely founded by private citizens, as the movement gained traction, the polis soon overtook its
administration.48 In 420 BCE, the Athenians celebrated Asclepius with an inaugural festival and
with the construction of two major sanctuaries for healing and worship, one on the south slope of
the Acropolis and the other in Piraeus.49 Some scholars have gone so far as to describe this
uptick in religious practices as a social movement: Harry Perlstadt writes that the rise of the Cult
of Asclepius featured both “redemptive religious healing and a reformative political strategy.”50
Widespread worship of Asclepius renewed religious healing practices that had been disrupted by
the plague and the Peloponnesian War. It can, however, be argued that a resurgence in religious
practices may have been one of only a few benign outcomes of the plague, as the city of Athens
largely remained in a state of moral, social, and political disarray.
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Political Changes
In his Funeral Oration, Pericles had trumpeted how accepting Athens was of other
cultures, claiming that Athenians “throw open [their] city to the world.”51 It is true that Athens
attracted and welcomed many immigrants from other areas of Greece, however, even during
Pericles’ reign, these immigrants were not entitled to the same rights as Athenian citizens. In
451 BCE, Pericles imposed an immigration law that restricted Athenian citizenship rights to
individuals born of two Athenian citizens.52 This effectively reduced the political power of
Metics (immigrants), as land ownership and jurorships were privileges restricted solely to
Athenian citizens.53 Thus, while Athenian leaders were clearly implementing a nativist agenda
prior to the outbreak of the plague, there is evidence to suggest that this movement and antiimmigrant sentiment were exacerbated by the plague’s death toll, which may have shifted the
demographic balance between citizens and Metics.54
Pericles’ successors failed to make Athens a more accepting place or to increase the
number of its citizens by allowing only wealthy Metics entry into the ranks of the Athenian
citizenry. Desperate to secure their already futile positions of power, Pericles’ successors instead
elected to further restrict citizenship opportunities. Metics who wished to become citizens were
required to pay large sums of money to the Athenian government and were expected to devote
the majority of their life to public service in Athens.55 Those lucky enough to ultimately acquire
citizenship were granted the privilege late in life and were not permitted to confer such status
upon their kin.56 The decades after the plague saw only further tightening of the restrictions
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against Metics, which had begun in the 450s BCE, and Pericles’ immigration law was re-enacted
in 403 BCE.57 Thus, the plague’s death toll stimulated an increasingly nativist sentiment among
Athenian citizens and resulted in the decline of Metic status in Athens.
Both Pericles’ death and the moral decline brought about by the plague debased Athenian
leadership and politics. As the “greatest statesmen of the era,”58 Pericles had led Athens with
integrity, grace, and fair-mindedness until his death from the plague at the age of 65. For as long
as he was head of state, he pursued a “moderate and conservative policy” that was well-received
by the public.59 Ancient sources, with near-complete unanimity, praise Pericles’ wisdom,
courage, and incorruptibility. Some modern scholars have asserted that Pericles’ death may be to
blame for Athens’ downfall in the post-plague era: M. A. Soupios contends that “In carrying off
Pericles, the plague deprived Athens of the one man who had the courage and capacity to
remonstrate the citizenry.”60
In the void of Pericles’ adept leadership, Athens suffered from “in-fighting, toxic politics,
and selfish leaders” for years after the plague had run its course through the city.61 A host of
demagogic politicians came into power in Athens in the post-Periclean era, such as Cleon,
Alcibiades, Cleophon, and Hyperbolus. These politicians did not lead in the interests of those
who had elected them. Instead, they acted in their own self-interest, drove the people “by
creating enemies that [did] not exist,”62 manipulated the emotions of the populace, fearmongered, and relied on the use of inflammatory language and theatrical behavior to evince their
rhetorical points. Demagoguery feeds on exploitation, and the ancient demagogues sought to
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create turmoil and social division to secure their positions of power at any cost. Thucydides
denounced the “host of blunders” each of Pericles’ successors generated in their attempts to
“grasp […] at supremacy,”63 and appeared deeply skeptical of the “new paradigm of fantasy
politics”64 he believed Athens had adopted.

Impact on Military
Despite being disadvantaged by a depletion of their armed forces, the Athenians
continued to fight the Spartans in the Peloponnesian War for nearly twenty more years. The
adverse effects of new politicians’ poor leadership on Athenian civilians and military forces were
exacerbated by the significant extent to which the plague had depleted Athenian manpower. The
plague had a high death toll among Athenian military forces: the naval force, before Potidaea,
lost approximately 25% of its manpower in just forty days after the outbreak of the plague,65 and
the cumulative loss in manpower across the various waves of the plague amounted to 4,400
hoplites and 300 cavalry.66 Given the labor-intensive nature of ancient warfare, such an extreme
loss of manpower was problematic for the Athenians and placed them at a significant
disadvantage in the Peloponnesian War.
A particularly stark example of how sharply Athenian political leadership had declined
was the Sicilian Expedition, which some scholars have referred to as the “greatest military
blunder” of the Peloponnesian War.67 In 415 BCE, Athenian leader Alcibiades, using his
trademark seductive oratory tactics, managed to persuade the Athenian assembly to launch a
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major military expedition against Syracuse—a Sicilian ally of the Peloponnesians—and thereby
recklessly open a second front in the west. Shortly thereafter, however, Alcibiades’ political
opponents in Athens brought charges of sacrilege against him.68 Rather than remaining in
Athens and attempting to combat the charges he faced, Alcibiades fled, leaving the Sicilian
Expedition in the hands of a reluctant Nicias.
Instead of seizing the opportunity to exile somewhere along the Aegean coast, Alcibiades
instead traveled to Sparta and divulged the Athenian’s plans to attack Syracuse. Sparta
immediately sent assistance to the Sicilians to bolster their military forces prior to the arrival of
the Athenians.69 Athenian forces, unsuspecting and inadequately prepared, suffered a stunning
defeat upon their arrival at Syracuse.70 The Peloponnesian War ultimately culminated in
Athenian loss in 404 BCE, which further diminished Athens’ power across the Aegean.71 And,
in 338 BCE—less than a century after the outbreak of the Plague—the city of Athens lost its
independence and “superpower” status for good when Philip II of Macedon conquered the city
along with the rest of Greece.

Conclusion
Although it had taken Athens centuries of innovation, military campaigns, and diplomatic
efforts to reach the apex of its prominence and glory, when the Plague struck in 430 BC, it took
mere weeks for Athenian culture and values to shatter, and for lawlessness and disorder to erupt.
While these unforeseen exogenous events appear to have quickly up-ended a society, the rapid
disintegration of Athenian values has prompted some scholars to question (1) the veracity of
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Pericles’ description of the Athenian people in his funeral oration (i.e., perhaps he ascribed
characteristics and values to Athenians which many of them did not, in fact, embody), and (2)
whether Thucydides may have embellished Pericles’ words in his account to emphasize the
disparities between Athenian life pre and post-plague. While it is important to examine the
possible biases that have influenced modern interpretation of Pericles’ Funeral Oration, due to a
lack of other surviving accounts, it may be impossible to discern the true state of Athenian moral
values in the eras before and after the Plague of Athens.
Ancient authors concur that Pericles embodied the Athenian ideals he put forth in his
Funeral Oration, and praise Pericles for his prudent and judicious leadership qualities. But,
given how quickly Athens unraveled after Pericles’ death, it is understandable why some have
speculated whether or not his soldiers and Athenian civilians embodied such qualities to a
comparable extent. Clifford Orwin highlights the significance of hope (and the loss thereof),
writing that “Political life depends on hopes and fears for the future, and therefore the
expectation of one.”72 With nothing to either hope or fear for the future, men immerse
themselves in pleasures “as depend only on themselves, but on themselves as transformed by
their indifference to the future, and the godlike (if fleeting) impunity which this confers.”73
Thus, it may alternatively be the case that many Athenian men embodied the great moral
character Pericles proclaimed them to have, but that the arrant disruption caused by the plague
made them lose hope for the future, degrading their behavior and values.
Hellmut Flashar asserts that “Thucydides’ goal is an ironic exposure of the tension
between the true situation at Athens and the sugar-coated Periclean picture,”74 which suggests
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that Thucydides’ stark contrast between the Funeral Oration and the outbreak of the plague were
designed to call into question Pericles’ overly flattering description of Athenian values and
behavior. Tobias Joho expresses a more moderate stance, positing that “the character of Athens
is not statically given, but constantly resituates itself along a spectrum, whose extreme points are
marked by the Funeral Oration and the plague.”75 So, it is possible that the values and conduct
of the Athenians pre and post-plague may have been less of a dichotomy than Thucydides makes
them out to be, but instead resonate along a continuum.
It seems obvious that any great society, even at its zenith, is not entirely flawless—
Athens included. While Athenian democracy, leadership, and knowledge flourished in the fifth
century BCE, Athens was by no means utopian. Certain social issues, such as the rights of
immigrants and inequality between the wealthy and poor, were simply given less attention.
Thus, the Plague of Athens both exacerbated existing social issues, while simultaneously
creating a multitude of additional problems. By claiming the life of one of Greece’s most
extraordinary and well-liked leaders, degenerating Athenian values and morals, and—as a
consequence—wreaking havoc on Athenian politics and military campaigns, the plague crippled
a once-illustrious city that appeared destined for further greatness, and sent Athens spiraling
headlong towards disaster.
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THE ANTONINE PLAGUE (165 CE)

Background
By the first century CE, Rome had become one of the largest and most prosperous
civilizations the world had ever seen. The city of Rome was home to more than one million
inhabitants—the first and only western city to reach that size until London in the 1800s.76 The
Roman Empire was an even more astonishing sight to behold: in 165 AD, at the height of
Rome’s power, it was home to more than 75 million people77 and encompassed an expansive
area of land, stretching from the Middle East to the Iberian Peninsula, and from North Africa to
Britain. It was hardly hyperbolical for the Romans to call the Mediterranean mare nostrum; our
sea.
The period from 80 BC to 180 CE is often referred to as the pax Romana, a golden era
and high point of Roman civilization marked by a period of relative peace and prosperity
throughout the empire. Individuals from across the empire flocked to Rome, which had become
“a place for thought, reasoning, and sharing ideas; an elite storehouse of commodities,
entertainment, and scholarship.”78 Roman technology and innovation burgeoned and became a
sight to behold, as did Rome itself, as it had become “a marvel of civil engineering,”79 home to
grand architectural projects and aqueducts. Culture and politics blossomed, and the late republic
and early empire grew under the guidance of great leaders widely revered by the public, such as
Antoninus Pius. Pius’ rule from 138-161 CE was one of the most harmonious and successful in
Roman history. A poised and selfless leader, Antoninus Pius denounced luxury, pursued a
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moderate economic policy, financed infrastructure projects, and even used his own money to
purchase food and wine for the poor in times of need.80
Rome’s economy flourished under the rule of Pius and his predecessors. The Roman
Climate Optimum (200 BCE - 150 CE) had afforded lands across the Roman Empire with warm,
wet, and stable climate. Spectacular weather conditions, aided by new technological advances
such as watermills and metal tools, allowed agricultural productivity to skyrocket.81 Banks and
advanced financial credit systems created new opportunities for entrepreneurship and bolstered
the economy. Increased travel and trade also contributed to economic growth: commerce
exploded during the pax Romana, marking a “golden age of trade”82 in which trade networks
spread like spider webs, connecting far-flung corners of the empire to more centralized towns
and cities.
With nearly a quarter of the world’s total population under Rome’s sway,83 the Roman
Empire had succeeded in creating an enormous region of internal trade, travel, socialization,
innovation, and agricultural cultivation on an unprecedented scale. This would not have been
possible without Rome’s military prowess. Including legions, auxiliary units, navy, and irregular
units, the Roman “imperial war machine” was composed of approximately 500,000 men.84 Raw
manpower was the main ingredient for Rome’s military success.85 During the pax Romana,
Rome had largely succeeded in the challenging task of striking a balance between increased
territorial conquest and the preservation of peace and security within the core zone of the empire.
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Yet this balance was fragile, and maintained by prudent leadership, shrewd military strategy, and
to some extent, good fortune.
The first test to this balance had begun to develop towards the end of Antoninus Pius’
reign, as tensions between Rome and Parthia over Roman control of Armenia intensified. Upon
Pius’ death, these tensions reached a boiling point: the Parthians made a grab for power by
placing their own candidate on the Armenian throne. The new Roman emperor, Marcus
Aurelius, was tasked with squashing this threat from the east. In 162 CE, Marcus sent his coemperor, Lucius Verus, to fight the Parthians.86 With the support of multiple legions and the
expertise of several accomplished Roman generals, the Romans emerged victorious in 166 and
triumphantly returned to Rome. Unbeknownst to Marcus and Lucius at the time, however, was
the fact that the remainder of their long and troubled reign would be marked by a series of futile
attempts to ward off foreign invaders who posed a threat to the delicate balance and security of
the Roman Empire.

Outbreak of Plague
When Lucius Verus returned to Rome after the successful Parthian Campaign, he was
rewarded with a triumph—a traditional civil and religious ceremony of Ancient Rome, designed
to publicly celebrate exceptional successes of Roman military commanders. As Lucius rode
through the streets of Rome in a chariot, accompanied by his army and their spoils of war, the
Roman people extravagantly celebrated his defeat of the enemy in the east. Little did they know
at the time that a completely different enemy had already made its way past the borders of the
empire, and was about to attack.
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The Antonine Plague first emerged in Mesopotamia at the end of 165 or the beginning of
166 CE. By the end of the year it had spread to Rome. The Roman metropolis, with its high
population density and commerce connections across the empire, was a “pathogen bomb,
diffusing carriers of the disease across the western Mediterranean.”87 By 168 CE, the plague had
ravaged Rome and spread across the Roman Empire, decimating towns and peoples across the
Roman world. Some scholars believe that it may have traveled as far as China.88 The spread of
disease was exacerbated by the vast trade networks that crisscrossed the empire, as well as the
highly urbanized nature of Roman society—as many as one-fifth of the empire’s denizens are
believed to have lived in towns,89 and this high degree of urbanization intensified the contagion
of the plague. In Rome and other large cities in the Empire, houses were tightly packed in the
center of the city to encourage frequent social interaction and gatherings around public
monuments.90 Not even those who lived in the countryside were spared, however, as many
frequently commuted to nearby cities to conduct business and trade. Moreover, many Romans—
both the impoverished and the wealthy—had poor diets and suffered from malnutrition, which
made them more susceptible to falling ill.91 High population density, frequent travel,
malnutrition, and poor sanitary conditions and waste disposal systems within cities (untreated
sewage often flowed into the Tiber),92 all exacerbated the spread of and suffering from the
plague.
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Contemporary Account of Symptoms and Modern Medical Assessment
Galen, a prominent physician who was living in Rome when the plague hit in 166 CE,
recorded his observations and experience of treating those who had fallen ill in the fifth book of
his Methodus Medendi (“On the Method of Healing”). While Galen’s accounts are the most
extensive description that remains from the time of the Antonine Plague, he only twice refers to
the disease, and neither account is particularly “substantiated or substantial.”93 Galen was not
attempting to provide a comprehensive description of the plague, or to record its symptoms for
the benefit of future generations in the way that Thucydides had done for the Plague of Athens.
Instead, he was more interested in recording the physical effects the disease had on its victims
and the efficacy of different treatments.
According to Galen, symptoms of the Antonine Plague included a high fever, soon
followed by the appearance of black “cutaneous lesions and pustulas”94 all over the body, which
eventually began to dry up in instances where a patient was expected to survive.95 The infected
soon experienced an upset stomach, black stool or diarrhea (indication of intestinal lesions), and
in some cases, vomiting.96 Many suffered from lesions in their throats as well: patients first
coughed up scabs, then fresh blood, and later began to cough up part of their esophageal or
mucous membranes.97 Others suffered from pulmonary issues, internal hemorrhaging, insomnia,
and gangrene.98
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No direct paleomicrobiological or archaeological evidence has been recovered from the
time of the Antonine Plague, and as a result, DNA sequencing is not a viable option for modern
scientists to identify the type of disease that struck Rome.99 Despite a lack of concrete physical
evidence, scholars largely concur that the Antonine Plague is most likely to have been caused by
smallpox. The unique nature of the exanthem that appeared on the bodies of the infected, in
addition to the high mortality rate of the disease, have led R. J. and M. L. Littman to conclude
that the pestilence must have been hemorrhagic smallpox.100 In the Littmans’ widely cited
article, they explain that the duration of the disease, combined with the other symptoms that
Galen describes (i.e., fever, black stool, vomiting, and coughing) are all consistent with
smallpox.101 The highly contagious nature of smallpox also makes it a likely candidate for the
Antonine plague, as it is directly transmissible and can be contracted by the inhalation of
airborne droplets expelled by an infected individual. Hemorrhagic smallpox is the most lethal
type of smallpox, and other scholars believe the particular strain responsible may have been
poxviridae, an ancestor of smallpox.102 This theory may be useful in explaining some of the
differences in severity between the symptoms of the Antonine Plague and those of more modern
strains of smallpox.

Archaeological Evidence and Mortality Estimates
While more physical evidence remains from the period of the Antonine Plague than from
certain other plagues, even then, the evidence is scant and often confusing to interpret. As Colin
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P. Elliott writes, “The existing epigraphic, papyrological and literary evidence is ambiguous at
best. It provides only a vague sense of both the chronology and causality behind a secondcentury crisis which clearly featured many interconnected parts.”103 However, the lack of
documentation from the period during which the plague is believed to have hit Rome the hardest
actually may be a sign of the destructive impact that the plague had on Roman society.
According to R. P. Duncan-Jones, the abrupt decline in available documentary series so closely
with the dates of the major outbreaks of the Antonine Plague that a “connection with plague is
likely.”104
The overall death toll and mortality rate of the Antonine Plague have been a hot topic of
debate among scholars for decades. Modern historians estimate the mortality rate of the
pestilence to be anywhere from 1 to 33 percent, which translates to a confounding range of 1 to
25 million deaths.105 Attempting to make such estimates is inherently challenging, as ancient
sources are not only vague, but scholars have reason to believe that certain ancient authors may
have exaggerated their accounts or estimates of the plague’s death toll. According to Géza
Alföldy, “the tradition of Roman pessimism regarding the history of one’s own time was, as we
know, as old as Roman literature itself.”106
Estimating the epidemic’s death toll is also complicated by the fact that the same disease
can have varying effects on the different regions due to factors like population density and
individuals’ nutrition. Take the Plague of Athens, for example: ancient writers recount the
ferocity with which the plague struck Athens, yet the areas surrounding the city—characterized
by significantly lower population density—were barely affected. Another issue is that the
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majority of the papyrological evidence and data about population sizes that has survived from the
Antonine period originate from Egypt.107 Nonetheless, many scholars have attempted to use
Egyptian census data to hypothesize the impact the plague may have had in the city of Rome or
in other parts of the empire. Eriny Hanna warns of the dangers of conducting such a task,
because “Egypt’s geography, culture, and division of labor were significantly different than any
other province, let alone a city.”108
Nor does modern scientific knowledge of smallpox aid in a death toll analysis: the
Littmans write that, depending on the virulence of a given strain, the mortality rate of a smallpox
outbreak might range anywhere from 1 to 80 percent.109 On one extreme, some scholars (e.g.,
Otto Seeck) have posited that over half of the Roman Empire’s population perished from the
Antonine Plague.110 On the other extreme (e.g., J.F. Gilliam), some scholars believe the
mortality rate was only one or two percent.111 However, most scholars agree that a mortality rate
anywhere between 7 and 10 percent, or 7 to 8 million total deaths, is a more reasonable estimate
for the total death toll of the Antonine Plague in the 23 years during which it spread across the
empire.112 Yet, even the estimates on the lower end of the range have a sufficiently hefty death
toll to arouse concern: Kyle Harper writes that, even at the lowest estimates, the plague “was, in
absolute terms, the worst disease event in human history up to that time.”113 It may be
reasonable to assume that the mortality rates were lower in rural areas and higher (13-15%) in
cities and armies.114
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Impact on Military
The plague took a disproportionate toll on Roman military forces. As the plague
continued to ravage Rome towards the end of 168 CE, Romans faced a threat to their northeast
border, as the Marcomanni and Quadi had crossed the Danube and entered Italy.115 Both
emperors, Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius, attended by Galen, hastened north with their
armies to the winter camp at Aquileia. There, the plague decimated the Roman army, killing
many, including Lucius Verus in 169. Ancient historian Jerome attested that the Roman army
suffered a catastrophic loss of life due to the plague, and that by 172 CE, the army had been
nearly reduced to extinction.116 The legions, citing loss of manpower, petitioned for help from
Rome.117 Marcus Aurelius was forced to employ emergency recruiting measures to revitalize the
Roman forces: his biography reports that he resorted to “emergency conscriptions of slaves and
gladiators and unusual levies of brigands.”118
The severely depleted army placed Rome at a considerable disadvantage for the
remainder of the Marcomannic Wars. Marcus spent the final decade of his life in a “grinding
and indecisive campaign” in the north.119 Upon his death in 180 CE, the Roman army still
needed to conduct another year or two of warfare to secure the northern border.120 However, the
new emperor Commodus, eager to return to Rome and relish in the “ease and luxury of the
imperial court,” conceded the territory which the Romans had been fighting for and entered into
a peace treaty with the Marcomanni.121 Roman triumph in the Parthian campaign of 166 would
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be Rome’s sole military success for nearly fifty years. The army’s ability to fend off intruders
along the far-flung borders of the Roman Empire was permanently diminished in the wake of the
Antonine Plague: “never again was Rome to hold the upper hand in its dealings with the
Germanic tribes beyond the now reestablished borders of the empire.”122 The challenges Rome
faced at its borders and beyond in the post-Marcus Aurelius era are believed by some historians
to have marked a turning point in the “fortunes of the empire.”123 Yet the loss in military might
and manpower was only one of many detrimental effects the Antonine Plague had on Rome.
Having swept across the empire for at least fifteen years after the initial outbreak in 165 CE, the
plague also had a profound impact on economic, social, religious, and political aspects of Roman
society.

Economic Impact
From the late republic through the early empire, Rome had enjoyed a prosperous and
remarkably stable economy: according to Peter Temin’s data analysis, prices remained stable,
and inflation remained below two percent each year.124 In response to the Antonine Plague,
however, prices and wages rose sharply—nearly doubling—towards the end of the second
century CE.125 The supply of labor decreased as many workers had died from the plague. While
the same amount of money remained in circulation as there had been prior to the plague, it was
dispersed among fewer consumers, who in turn used their money to bid up the prices of goods in
short supply.126 Agricultural production was disrupted, and a reduction in the population shifted
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the ratio of land to labor across the countrysides of the empire.127 As labor became more scarce
and land more abundant, labor prices and wages increased, while land prices plummeted.128
Data from Roman Egypt indicates that land, rent, wine, and oil prices all decreased during the
time of the epidemic, wheat prices stayed the same (this is largely attributable to the fact that
Egypt was a major wheat exporter), while monthly wages and donkey prices increased.129
Production plummeted in other sectors of the economy as well. The mining of silver
collapsed suddenly, creating a short-term monetary crisis that resulted in the debasement of
silver coinage from 165 CE onwards.130 Public infrastructure projects appear to have all but
ceased for some time after the plague. A gap in records from 166 to 173 CE suggests that there
was little activity in Rome’s marble quarries during the Antonine Plague, and when activity later
resumed, it occurred on a much smaller scale than before.131 The plague’s death toll reduced the
number of taxpayers, businessmen, and farmers throughout the Roman Empire. This quickly
became problematic, as expenses for maintaining the empire and paying military forces
continued to rise as individual earnings and government revenue declined.
It is clear that the Roman Empire was in dire need of money: the high costs of waging
war and employing soldiers to fight the Macromanni took a toll on imperial finances during
Marcus Aurelius’ reign, as he was forced to auction off treasures from the imperial palace to
raise military funds.132 However, there is ample evidence to suggest that the Empire continued
to struggle financially for decades after Marcus’ death. In the first and second centuries CE,
Roman rulers had taken a relatively laissez-faire approach to their management of Roman
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territories. The empire was “highly decentralized,” with local governors and advisors ruling
their respective provinces, while local elites handled tax collection.133 After the Antonine
Plague, however, the Roman taxation system became increasingly centralized: central
government officials, tasked with the collection of taxes and supplies for the state, were
dispatched to various cities and countrysides across the empire.134 According to Arjan
Zuiderhoek, ancient sources “point towards a clear central government attempt to gain greater
direct control over provincial surplus extraction by means of centralizing the gathering of taxes,”
and such a response is “expected” of an imperial government grappling with declining tax
revenue spurred by demographic contraction.135 The Antonine Plague appears to have had a
destructive impact on the Roman economy and the Empire’s financial situation.
Nowhere in the Roman Empire were the tremors of economic decline felt more than in
Roman Egypt. Egypt featured the highest population density of any province in the empire—
nearly 300 people per square kilometer,136 which created conditions ripe for the spread of
disease. Thus, while population decline from the plague had already taken a toll on local
economies, the imperial taxes imposed upon Egyptian villages exacerbated the financial
struggles that many faced. The collection of Egyptian poll taxes—flat-rate taxes paid by all adult
male residents—was delegated to the municipal level, and local communities were expected to
collect payment from their residents.137 The value of the taxes each town was expected to gather
were calculated using census data that was collected every fourteen years.138 Understandably,
the plague’s death toll must have created a serious burden on local towns to collect taxes, the
133

Zuiderhoek, “Government Centralization in Late Second and Third Century A.D. Asia Minor: A Working
Hypothesis,” 41.
134
Ibid, 46-47.
135
Ibid, 47.
136
Elliott, “The Antonine Plague, Climate Change and Local Violence in Roman Egypt,” 8-9.
137
Ibid, 14-15.
138
Ibid.

38
amount of which had been calculated based on their pre-plague population.139 Census figures in
tax documents indicate that villages along the Nile delta suffered dramatic population loss, which
is likely attributable to some combination of individuals having died from the plague and
individuals having fled to other areas. Between A.D. 159/60 and 169/70, some towns in the Nile
delta showed a 70-90% decline in adult male registered taxpayers.140 This astonishing decrease
in population is likely due to some combination of plague deaths and the decision of many to flee
so that they could avoid paying hefty taxes.
Economic struggles that initially had been caused by the plague’s death toll soon
precipitated an agricultural crisis, which further worsened the economic situation in Roman
Egypt. Farm leases in Egypt during and after the Antonine Plague “show strong
abnormalities.”141 Many individuals began to rent significantly smaller plots of land in the
decades following the plague, and agricultural production levels appear to have been remarkably
far off from their projections. P.Oxy.LXVI 4527, a list of taxes “from the meris of Herakleides
in the Arsinoite nome” dating from 185 CE, indicates that the percentage of wheat harvested at
the end of the year was only 27.5% of the projected figure.142 According to Elliott, Roman
Egypt’s “volatile mixture of a short-term agricultural crisis, tax burdens, and economic
inequality” may also explain the surge in civil unrest in the years during and after the outbreak of
plague in Egypt.143
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Social Changes
While Egypt faced social unrest and revolts in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague and
in response to the tanking economy, whether or not comparable social unrest occurred in other
areas of the Roman Empire is a subject of debate among scholars. Danielle Gourevitch broadly
asserts that the Roman population was panic-stricken and “behaved strangely, coming to unusual
religious and magical attitudes, unheard of cowardly acts, and dangerous disturbances.”144 On
the other hand, Kyle Harper argues that “None of the literary sources for the Antonine Plague
report social chaos in the midst of the pestilence; the integrity of the social order seems to have
held together, except perhaps for a complex crisis in the Nile delta.”145 Without a doubt, the
plague disrupted Roman citizens’ way of life. However, whether or not such unrest occurred on
a scale similar to the Nile delta is unclear.
Although a semblance of social order may have been preserved in many areas of the
Roman Empire—the Nile Delta notwithstanding—the Antonine Plague era was marked by
considerable social change. Even prior to the Antonine Plague, Roman society had been
remarkably accepting and provided opportunities for social mobility: citizenship rights were
liberally bestowed, and men from provinces were able to gain entry into the upper classes of the
Roman aristocracy.146 While wealth was unequally distributed and Rome was home to an
extensive slavery system, Roman society was still markedly more progressive than many other
ancient societies. The plague did not level social equality—even after the plague, Rome’s
political and landlord classes were able to exert control over the empire’s agricultural territories
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and rural populations.147 However, it did create new opportunities for commoners to hold
political office. For example, the heavy mortality of the Antonine Plague in Athens claimed the
lives of so many individuals who had previously been eligible to hold office that Marcus
Aurelius was forced to loosen the requirements for eligibility in the 170s. In 174/75, Marcus
Aurelius wrote to Athens to loosen the rules for office-holding, scrapping the previous
requirement that any individual who wished to hold office needed to have three generations of
citizen ancestry.148 According to Duncan-Jones, Marcus’ sudden abandonment of these rules
indicates a “serious crisis.”149

Religious Changes
The Antonine Plague ushered in an era of religious change across the empire as well. In
the absence of germ theory, many turned to religion for an explanation of the origins of the
plague. One theory was that, while the Romans were sacking Seleucia after having defeated the
Parthians, Lucius Verus opened a sealed tomb that released the virus.150 According to this
theory, the plague was a punishment from the gods, as the Romans had violated an earlier oath
not to pillage the city. The other preeminent explanation was that a Roman soldier had opened a
casket in the Temple of Apollo in Babylon, which allowed the plague to escape.151 Both theories
persisted for centuries after the plague’s outbreak: two different fourth-century sources “ascribe
the outbreak to participating in a sacrilege, violating the sanctuary of a god and breaking the
oath.”152 As many Romans believed these theories to be legitimate explanations for the onset of
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the pestilence, the immediate response was a widespread worship of Apollo, in the hopes that the
god might be appeased into warding off the plague.153 Eleven apotropaic inscriptions have been
found on stones recovered from various corners of the empire, which, embedded into stone walls
to ward off the plague, prayed “To the gods and goddesses, according to the interpretation of
Apollo at Claros.”154 According to Kyle Harper, the proliferation of Apolline religion generated
by the Antonine plague was “utterly unlike anything else in the records of ancient epigraphy.”155
However, polytheistic worship of the Greco-Roman gods—the prevalent form of religion
for the previous several centuries—was no longer the only religion in town. Christianity had
made its way to Rome and was on the rise. While the influence of the church spread rapidly
across the empire in the second century, Christians’ position within Roman society was far from
desirable, as they were often made as scapegoats for local crises and subjected to abuse or
punishment.156 Things worsened during the plague, as Marcus Aurelius launched persecutions
against Christians who refused to pay homage to the Greco-Roman gods, whom Marcus believed
had made their wrath known in the form of the epidemic.157 Despite the violence that they faced
from the Roman authorities, Christians proved invaluable to Roman society in the late second
century. Christians believed they were obligated to help others in times of sickness or need, and
while the Antonine Plague ravaged Rome, many brought food and water to the sick and helped
care for them.158 While the violence Christians faced at the hands of the Roman imperial
government during the plague is disconcerting, some scholars believe that Christianity ultimately
gained traction in the aftermath of the plague, as the promise of salvation in the afterlife attracted

153

Harper, The Fate of Rome, 100.
Ibid, 100-101.
155
Ibid, 101.
156
Benario, “Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-180).”
157
Horgan, “Antonine Plague.”
158
Ibid.
154

42
additional followers.159 Thus, the pestilence was marked by an upheaval of the pre-existing
religious order, which often came at the cost of Christian livelihood, in spite of the help the
Christians had provided to the sick.

Political Changes
Another consequence of the plague was that it cut short Marcus Aurelius’ life. Although
Marcus Aurelius’ reign was consumed by his military standoff in the north, his personal
reputation has “never failed of admirers,”160 and he attempted to do his best to lead the Roman
people through troublesome times. He devoted the majority of his time and resources to
defending the borders of the Roman Empire and is often regarded as a man of ability with a
strong sense of duty to Rome. Put simply, Marcus “sacrificed his own delights and interests to
the well-being of the state.”161 Unfortunately, the same cannot not be said of his successors.
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus would be the last of the “Five Good Emperors,”162 as his son
and successor Commodus did not embody similar leadership qualities. Commodus was a
narcissistic emperor whose rule was marred by political strife and outrageous behavior.
Commodus claimed that he was related to Hercules and dressed accordingly, often donning lion
skins and carrying a club.163 He declared himself the “new Romulus” in 190 CE, and just two
years later, gave himself the official title of “Hercules.”164 Commodus later attempted to rename
every month of the calendar to correspond to the various absurd titles he had bestowed upon
himself.165 With growing vigor, the emperor Commodus presented himself “as the center of
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Roman life.”166 While Commodus frequently proclaimed that his era of leadership should be
regarded as a “Golden Age,” in the view of Dio Cassius—a third century historian—Commodus’
accession as emperor marked the descent of the Roman Empire “from a kingdom of gold to one
of rust and iron.”167
While the Antonine Plague did not cause an immediate leadership struggle, it clipped
“the miraculous efflorescence of the pax Romana” at its bloom.168 The years following
Commodus’ reign were distinguished by a frequent turnover of emperors. According to Temin,
the number of emperors in each half-century remained in the single digits until the late second
century, “after which it stayed in double digits until 500 CE.”169

Conclusion
In many ways, it is unfortunate that the very things that made the Roman Empire great in
the first and second centuries—trade, travel, frequent exchange of ideas, control over large
swaths of territory, and military might—were what exacerbated the spread and destruction
caused by the Antonine Plague. While social issues and inequalities existed in the empire prior
to the outbreak of plague, many problems were either created or amplified by the pestilence. The
outbreak of the Antonine Plague has been cited by some historians as a turning point in the
history of the Roman Empire; a calamity that sent Rome hurtling towards collapse. The ancient
historian Herodian wrote that the period of Roman history after the death of Marcus Aurelius
was “a continual series of heavy catastrophes, interrupted at best by short breathing-spells which
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were followed, however, by worse periods, with the danger that the Empire might collapse.”170
The Cunhas write that the Antonine Plague “was a blow from which Rome never recovered,”171
and that it “most definitely set Rome on her long decline to ruin.”172 Christer Bruun urges
readers to take caution in accepting such a narrative, remarking that readers should not take late
literary sources “at face value when they claim [the Antonine Plague] was the worst ever.”173
While the Roman Empire certainly needed time to recover from the effects of the
Antonine Plague, many scholars believe that Rome was able to recuperate in the decades that
followed. Although Rome never returned to the height of its pre-plague population, Harper
reminds us that the empire was so heavily populated prior to the plague that even a considerable
death toll would have left Rome by no means empty.174 Claims other authors have made, like
“so many people died that the economy came close to failing,”175 are not credible in the context
of an estimated 7-10% mortality rate. Moreover, in the years after the plague, birth rates
skyrocketed, and the population once again began to increase at a steady rate.176
Walter Scheidel urges caution in drawing sweeping conclusions regarding the
permanency of Roman decline after the Antonine Plague. Given the minimal evidence that
remains from the time, he urges that “historians would be well advised to exercise restraint in
instrumentalizing this poorly known event as a ‘deus ex machina’ mechanism to account for
presumed demographic or economic transformations.”177 Thus, while the Antonine Plague “was

170

Alföldy, “The Crisis of the Third Century as Seen by Contemporaries,” 95.
Cunha and Cunha, “Great Plagues of the Past and Remaining Questions,” 10.
172
Ibid, 13.
173
Bruun, “The Antonine Plague and the ‘Third-Century Crisis’,” 208.
174
Harper, The Fate of Rome, 116.
175
Mark, “Plague in the Ancient & Medieval World.”
176
Zuiderhoek, “Government Centralization in Late Second and Third Century A.D. Asia Minor: A Working
Hypothesis,” 42.
177
Sheidel, “Roman Wellbeing and the Economic Consequences of the ‘Antonine Plague,’” 23.
171

45
not a decisive event in Roman history,”178 A. E. R. Boak and other scholars suggest that the
Antonine Plague, along with other outbreaks, may represent a useful starting point for
understanding the beginning of the decline of the Roman Empire. It is undeniable that the
plague marked the end of the era of the pax Romana, created economic hardships for many, and
altered Roman politics, social dynamics, and religion. And while it cannot be said that the
Antonine Plague is to blame for the fall of the Roman Empire in the centuries that followed, the
upheaval of the status-quo that it provoked ended “a certain trajectory in the development of
Roman state and society.”179
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THE PLAGUE OF CYPRIAN (250 CE)

Background
In the century following the Antonine Plague, the Roman Empire slowly began to revive.
While the empire’s population levels would never again reach pre-Antonine Plague levels,
Rome’s population rebounded spectacularly. Under the prudent leadership of rulers from the
Severan Dynasty, the empire’s “most influential dynastic builders,”180 between the years of 193
and 235 CE Rome’s demography and economy recovered and flourished. Prices, which had
risen sharply in response to the plague, eventually stabilized, and the minted coinage of the
Roman state—despite having been debased—managed to regain full purchasing power.181
Citizenship rights were bestowed liberally from 212 onwards after Caracalla granted citizenship
to all free inhabitants of the Empire.182 A building boom serves as further evidence of the
recovery. The Severan emperors undertook ambitious construction projects, such as the famous
triumphal arch in the Roman Forum and the Baths of Caracalla. Peace had been re-established
and the empire re-stabilized.
Although Alexander Severus—the last of the Severans—was assassinated while
campaigning along the Rhine in 235, his successors continued to conduct military campaigns and
successfully secured the borders of the empire. After years of war with Persia, Philip the Arab,
who served as Rome’s emperor from 244 to 249, finally negotiated a peace treaty with the
Persian king Shapur I.183 Philip’s background, as well as his provincial and administrative

180

Ibid, 123.
Harper, “Pandemics and Passages to Late Antiquity: Rethinking the Plague of c.249–270 Described by Cyprian,”
250.
182
Harper, The Fate of Rome, 125.
183
Meckler and Körner, “Philip the Arab and Rival Claimants of the Later 240s.”
181

47
policies, were similar to those of the Severans. He attempted administrative reforms in Egypt
and commissioned the improvement of roads across the empire.184 In April of 248 CE, under
Philip the Arab’s reign, the Romans celebrated the 1000th anniversary of their city’s foundation.
This spectacular festival lasted for “three days and three nights,”185 as Romans took to the streets
to party and celebrate. There was much to extol: over the course of a millennium, Rome—once
a small village of outcasts and dreamers—now spanned three continents and had morphed into
one of the world’s most powerful empires.
Just one year later, Philip the Arab was murdered. He had sent one of his new
commanders, Gaius Messius Quintus Decius, north to assemble the Danubian troops, yet the
troops revolted and proclaimed Decius as their emperor.186 Decius’ troops subsequently
assassinated Philip. The abrupt end to Philip’s reign “touched off a spiral of dissolution that
would engulf the entire imperial order.”187 Decius, desperate to endear himself to the Roman
aristocracy and legitimize his rule, undertook “a highly conservative program of imperial
propaganda.”188 While his infrastructure projects were commendable, as he restored the Roman
Colosseum and commissioned the Decian baths, the wide-scale attacks he launched on Christians
were horrifying. Decius attacked the growing Christian minority within the empire, launching
empire-wide persecutions and promoting violence against them.189 In 251 CE, Decius was
murdered in battle at Abrittus, and Trebonianus Gallus was named as his successor.
Eager to head west and return to Rome to solidify his position as emperor, Gallus signed
a peace treaty with the Goths, whom he and Decius had been fighting in the east.190 The most
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formidable threat to the empire of which the Romans were aware had, for the time being, been
quelled. But, unbeknownst to the Romans at the time, another menacing enemy in the east had
already begun to move westward and was rapidly approaching the boundaries of the Roman
Empire.

Timeline and Contemporary Account of Symptoms
The Cyprian Plague hit major urban areas, towns, and countrysides alike, regardless of
population density. It was indiscriminate across social lines, highly contagious (in the words of
one 10th-century source, it was “transmitted through the clothing or simply by sight”191), and
attacked its victims mercilessly, displaying an exceptionally high mortality rate. It struck most
ferociously in the late fall and winter, and its effects were exacerbated by the drought and famine
that occurred throughout the Roman empire prior to the plague’s arrival and throughout the
multi-decade duration of the plague’s attack.192 The disease continued to resurface for two
decades after its original appearance; its presence has been attested by various circumMediterranean populations from 248 until 270.193
According to a letter from Dionysius of Alexandria, the Cyprian Plague first emerged in
Alexandria in 249. Moving from east to west, the disease quickly spread across the Roman
Empire, reaching Rome in the late summer or early fall of 251 CE, and arriving at Carthage in
the summer of 252. The plague featured an acute onset, debilitating diarrhea, an “attack of
fevers,” vomiting, excessive thirst, and conjunctival bleeding.194 In many cases, patients’ limbs
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had putrefied and needed to be amputated.195 According to Cyprian’s “De mortalitate”—the sole
surviving contemporary account of the disease’s symptoms—those who managed to survive
faced severe debilitation, brain damage, hearing loss, and blindness.196 While the Romans were
well acquainted with periodic cycles of epidemic mortality, the Plague of Cyprian “was
something qualitatively new”:197 a virgin soil epidemic to which no individual was immune.
The Cyprian Plague is surprisingly well attested, especially in light of third century Rome’s
notoriously obscure literary evidence. Kyle Harper has identified twenty-three distinct literary
witnesses to the plague, seven of whom were contemporary with the plague, hailing from across
the empire—from Egypt and North Africa to Syria and Athens.198

Modern Medical Assessment
To date, it has not been possible to ascertain the specific pathogen responsible for the
Plague of Cyprian through an examination of genetic evidence recovered from archaeological
remains. However, through careful analysis of available literary evidence from the time,
historians and scientists have been able to make a convincing disease assessment. In past
decades, historians have posited a wide range of possible diseases: measles (W. H. McNeil),
meningitis (H. Zinsser), smallpox, influenza, or bubonic plague.199 However, the symptoms and
seasonality of the plague—as described by ancient sources—make influenza, bubonic plague,
measles, meningitis, anthrax, cholera, or typhus unlikely.200 Smallpox remains a possibility, as
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its communicability and fatality rates align with the plague, along with a number of its other
symptoms, yet it can only be a “possible culprit,” as smallpox typically occurs in the summer,
and Cyprian does not mention the rash characteristic of smallpox.201
In the past two decades, scholars have come to agree that viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF),
a family of zoonotic diseases caused by a variety of RNA viruses, appears to be the most likely
disease responsible for the Cyprian Plague.202 There are various strains of VHF that can be
transmitted in different ways. However, scientists believe that the strains carried by rodents and
insects are unlikely to have caused the Cyprian Plague, as there is no literary evidence to suggest
that rodents were prevalent at the time, and the seasonality of the plague does not make insects
(typically mosquitoes in the case of VHF) a likely carrier.203 Thus, the most likely type of VHF
to be responsible for the plague of Cyprian is a filovirus: a hemorrhagic fever such as Ebola,
which is highly contagious and transmitted from one person to another via bodily fluids.204 Such
a virus can survive for days inside of dead bodies, making burial dangerous and a source of
spread for the infection.205 The symptoms of Ebola align exactly with those that Cyprian
describes. Moreover, the style of contagion would make sense in light of our knowledge
regarding the timeline of the Cyprian Plague. A filovirus would be able to diffuse quickly across
the empire, but because of its reliance on bodily fluids for transmission and its failure to confer
immunity upon its victims, “it could exhibit the slow burning, ‘unusually relentless’ dynamics
that so struck contemporary observers.”206 While Ebola virus may be used as a model for the
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Cyprian plague, it is possible that the plague was another strain of filovirus with which we are
unfamiliar in the modern era.207 This is because DNA from VHF diseases historically have not
held up well for long enough after the host’s death to make paleomicrobiology a feasible method
of confirmation.208

Mortality Estimates
Poor record-keeping from the third century has made it impossible to estimate the death
toll of the Cyprian Plague. One of Dionysius of Alexandria’s letters—addressed to the bishop
Hierax in 249—implies a 62% drop in the population of Alexandria during the time of the
Cyprian plague.209 However, as in the case of population decline during the Antonine Plague, it
is reasonable to assume that this drop is attributable to some combination of plague mortalities
and individuals fleeing from the region. In 262, it is written in the Historia Augusta that “Such a
great plague arose in both Rome and the cities of Greece that in one day 5000 people died of the
same disease.”210 While ancient authors are notorious for hyperbole, it is clear that the mortality
of the Cyprian Plague was exceptionally severe and struck on an unprecedented scale. The
Ebola crisis of 2013-2016 had a mortality rate somewhere between a 40 and 70%, and it would
be reasonable to estimate a similar mortality rate for those who were infected in Rome in the
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third century.211 Ancient sources affirm a grim death toll, describing the plague as a disease that
“day by day” abruptly “attack[ed] numberless people, every one from his own house.”212
There also exists strong archaeological evidence in support of an empire-wide plague in
the 250s CE. Archaeologists have discovered a mass grave in Thebes with a “purpose-built
corpse incineration complex.”213 Dating from the mid-third century, the burial methods for the
dead in this complex indicate haste and unorganized deposition.214 Therefore, it can reasonably
be assumed that those buried in this mass grave were victims of the Cyprian Plague.215 In 2002,
archaeologists recovered mass burials at the Catacombs of Marcellinus and Peter, unearthing
large rooms stacked with more than 1300 skeletons buried in a single event, the timing of which
also coincides with that of the Plague of Cyprian.216 According to Michael McCormick, these
specific findings, as well as others across the empire, may be considered as evidence of the
plague, as they are characterized by the “burial of a large number of human beings that violates
the traditional norms by which [Roman] society enmeshed and interpreted death.”217
This empire-wide pandemic wrought havoc across the three separate continents which the
Roman Empire straddled at the time, and spanned the reign of at least eight Roman emperors.
Such an enormous death toll and upheaval of daily life came with extreme religious, economic,
military, and sociopolitical changes.
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Religious Changes
Near the end of 249 CE, Decius required all Roman citizens to partake in pagan religious
sacrifices, and “deployed the machinery of the empire to enforce [his] order.”218 Not only were
Christians frequently scapegoated, but Decius forced them to prove their loyalty to Rome with an
act of pagan sacrifice. When many Christians refused to comply, the Roman government
extended its efforts to squash the growing church, exerting control over and inflicting
punishments upon those who refused to comply.
The majority pagan population, alongside pagan emperors, quickly blamed the outbreak
of the Cyprian Plague on the perceived failure of the Christian community to adequately worship
the pagan gods.219 As the pagans believed that Apollo had the power to protect them from
plague and famine, their worship of Apollo intensified in a similar manner as it had during the
Antonine Plague. This is evidenced by the large number of coins that were minted in the empire
from 251 to 260 CE inscribed with “Apollo Salutaris” (Apollo the healer).220 Despite the
charitable work of many Christians during the epidemic—they cared for the sick and even helped
the pagans when they fell ill—in 252 CE, Gallus, too, ordered sacrifices to be made across the
Empire. As Christian communities across the Roman Empire had already been “embattled before
the plague’s arrival,”221 Gallus’ order, paired with the high mortality and suffering caused by the
plague, heightened the terror that many felt.
One of the most comprehensive and frequently cited sources contemporary with the
plague is Cyprian’s “De mortalitate,” a sermon addressed to the Christian community during the
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plague’s outbreak at Carthage in 252 CE. Cyprian himself was a pagan who had converted to
Christianity and served as the Bishop of Carthage from 248 to 258.222 In his sermon, Cyprian
attempted to address the Christians’ fears surrounding the increasingly hostile treatment they
faced from the Roman government, as well as the high mortality rate of the epidemic as it
ravaged the city. As the extreme virulence of the virus made it unreasonable for him to foster
hope of physical healing, Cyprian instead attempted to persuade the Christians of the spiritual
gains that would result from their suffering from the plague, developing a “biblical framework”
through which the trials the Christians faced could be viewed as “spiritually beneficial.”223
At the time, Cyprian viewed the plague as an apocalyptic event that presaged the “end of
the territorial world and the coming to the kingdom of heaven.”224 Under the circumstances that
the third century Romans faced, it is understandable that they viewed the epidemic as
apocalyptic, because their lack of knowledge regarding the cause of the disease “led to a feeling
of complete helplessness and contributed greatly to the terror experienced during the
epidemic.”225 Cyprian reassured the Christians that the suffering they faced from the plague
would help to confirm their faith in God and secure their place in heaven, proclaiming that “all
the injury inflicted by present troubles is to be despised in the assurance of future blessing.”226
Moreover, he encouraged the Christians to “rejoice” in their ability to “stand erect amid the
desolation of the human race, and not to lie prostrate with those who have no hope in God.”227
While many Christians were troubled by the fact that the plague did not discriminate between
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them and the pagans, Cyprian attempted to dispel their anxieties and promote hope and
excitement for their ultimate arrival in heaven.
In 260 CE, Gallienus stopped the persecution of Christians, marking the beginning of an
era of peace upon the church that lasted for more than forty years. While the raw facts
concerning the rise of Christianity in the wake of the Cyprian plague are “obscure and heavily
debated,”228 it is evident that Christians began to move “confidently” and “in high circles,”
becoming “more visible than ever.”229 Until 200 CE, Christians had been “virtually invisible in
the documentary record,”230 but by 300 CE it was clear that Christianity had become more
widespread, as evidenced by the increased use of Christian names in papyri, and the construction
of Christian meeting spaces and burial sites in Rome.231 According to one estimate, by 300 CE,
up to 15-20% of the Egyptian population may have been Christian.232 While paganism remained
the most popular form of religion, in the wake of the Cyprian Plague, Christianity morphed from
being a marginal religion to a “minority” religion.233
Although the decade during which Cyprian was the Bishop of Carthage was marked by
“persecution, schism, and plague,”234 his leadership of the Christian community made a
significant contribution to the subsequent rise of Christianity. Cyprian was executed in 258 CE
for his failure to renounce Christianity and was awarded sainthood posthumously for his
martyrdom. Some scholars, such as Harper, have gone so far to assert that the ten years of
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Cyprian’s episcopate were “among the most consequential in the history of the church.”235 The
fact that the plague came to bear Cyprian’s name in its aftermath, and that this title has endured,
speaks to the great influence he wielded and all that he did for the church: Caroline Wazer
suggests that the adoption of the term “Cyprian Plague” to refer to the epidemic be viewed as
“hard proof of the superiority of Christianity over traditional Roman religion.”236

Economic Impact
In addition to the social turmoil and unstable political climate brought about by the
Cyprian Plague, it also caused the Roman economy to fluctuate wildly in the 250s and 260s CE.
Infrastructure projects stopped almost in their entirety, particularly in northern Syria around
250/1.237 Cyprian noted the problems caused by food shortages, the exhaustion of mines and
quarries, and the decline of craftsmanship and agriculture across the empire.238 De-urbanization,
rural population decline, and ruptures in production and trading systems have been proven
archaeologically as well.239 Tax records show a significant population decline in Egyptian
settlements,240 which is likely due to a combination of deaths from the plague and the decision of
others to relocate. This sequence of shocks to the monetary system around 250 caused the
Roman Empire’s silver-based monetary and financial system to disintegrate. The silver content
of coinage “virtually disappeared”241 as existing coins were melted and re-minted with a lower
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silver content, and the empire stopped minting denarius and sestertius coins.242 The quantity of
minted coins exploded, as did incidences of coin hoarding.
Inflation spiraled, and periods of hyperinflation occurred throughout the empire for
nearly ninety years after the outbreak of the Cyprian Plague.243 The sophisticated credit markets
and banking systems of the Roman world were wiped out, disappearing for more than a
generation. Emperors’ attempts to salvage the economy through currency reforms were to no
avail. Aurelian, in particular, attempted to improve Rome’s economy through monetary reform
in 274 by introducing antoniniani coins that contained five percent silver, a higher quantity of
silver than the coins being minted at the time.244 Not only was his reform unsuccessful—Harper
referred to it as “the final trigger for a precipitous collapse”—but it also conveys the severity of
the economic problems Aurelian faced, as twenty antoniniani contained the same amount of
silver as an old silver denarius.245 Rome’s “thousand-year epoch of silver money” came to a
crashing halt, and was eventually replaced by a gold system.246
The dissolution of the Roman currency regime caused the private Roman economy’s
infrastructure to crumble further. “An accelerating spiral of disorder engulfed the empire.”247
While the Roman economy had managed to restabilize and largely recover from the shocks it
experienced in the aftermath of the Antonine Plague, it had attained a precarious balance. The
exogenous jolt of the Cyprian Plague to an already stressed economy prompted the “unparalleled
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demise of a currency system”248 that had previously managed to survive debasement, social
unrest, and dynastic strife.

Impact on Military
The vast frontiers of the Roman Empire had faced threats from every direction in the
century following the Antonine Plague. Until the Cyprian Plague, however, Roman emperors
had—for the most part—been successful in their campaigns to protect the borders of the empire
from invading troops. The preservation of the integrity and size of the Roman Empire was
heavily dependent upon the state’s ability to maintain its defensive forces along its external
frontiers—the Rhine-Danube frontier and the Syrian-Anatolian frontier being of particular
concern.249 With Rome’s military forces debilitated by the Cyprian Plague, however, in the 250s
CE the state came to face enemies on nearly every frontier and eventually lost hegemony along a
number of fronts.
Threats to the Roman Empire had already begun to escalate along the Danube during the
reign of Philip the Arab. However, he managed to repel the attacks of various tribes along the
Lower Danube.250 Under Decius, the situation at the border exploded, and “the empire was faced
with cascading violence that it could not contain.”251 In 250, the Carpi and Goths crossed the
Danube and attacked. Decius was murdered a year later in battle against the Goths at Abrittus.252
It was around this time that the plague had begun to ravage the empire, and the losses suffered by
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the Roman military from the plague, as well as the political instability throughout the empire,
made Rome ripe for attack in the eyes of its enemies.
In the east, Persian king Shapur I advanced to the Euphrates in 252 CE, his attack directly
motivated by his knowledge that the Roman army had been depleted by the pestilence.253 Shapur
annexed Armenia, invaded Syria, and captured the city of Antioch. Gallus, preoccupied by his
dealings with the plague in Rome, failed “to take any serious action at all”—he did not even
attempt to bolster Rome’s defenses in the east to stop Shapur.254 One Roman frontier buckled
after another. In the years 250-252, the Danubian front collapsed, and the Romans lost control of
the entire Danube line.255 And in 252, after Shapur’s attack and plunder of interior Asia Minor,
the Euphrates front fell too.256 The Goths rampaged from the Black Sea to the Aegean. In the
mid-250s, the Rhine frontier system disintegrated.257 As Rome’s defensive network gradually
imploded, “the smell of blood seemed to draw attacks like never before.”258
When Valerian and his son Gallienus became co-emperors in 253 CE, they divided their
efforts geographically in an attempt to quell the threats they faced along the borders: Valerian
was responsible for commanding Roman troops in the east, while Gallienus handled the west.259
Gallienus valiantly fought against the Germanic tribes along the Gaul and Rhine frontier, and
successfully secured the stability of the region through his negotiation of an alliance with the
Marcomannic king.260 In the east, Valerian rescued Antioch from Persian control, but he was
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quickly taken captive by Shapur, leaving Gallienus as the sole ruler of the Roman Empire.261 For
the remainder of his reign, Gallienus faced a number of challenges to his authority—not only
from the recurring invasions and revolts from Rome’s enemies, but also by a number of the
military commanders he had appointed, who used their authority “to create another threat.”262
Gallienus was assassinated in 268 in a coup orchestrated by Claudius II.
Although he had not come to power in an ethical manner, during his two-year rule,
Claudius II managed to re-secure certain territories of the Roman Empire. He defeated the
Alemanni after they had invaded Italy, and stopped a massive Goth invasion (of >250,000 men),
winning the Gothic War for the time being.263 Claudius II’s reign was cut short by his death
from the Cyprian Plague in 270 when it demolished his troops at Sirmium.264
It is ironic that the very dispersal of Roman soldiers across the empire in the mid-250th
century to protect Rome’s borders, and their frequent movements throughout the empire, was a
factor that not only aided the spread of the Cyprian Plague across the Roman Empire, but also
exacerbated the effects of the Cyprian Plague as it weakened Rome and its military forces. The
instability of the West between 251 and 269 occurred on a level which Rome had never before
seen. Unfortified towns and villages along the borders of the empire, whose territory had
previously been taken for granted, were “razed by a profusion of invaders from the Lower Rhine
to the Black Sea.”265 Aurelian, who ruled as emperor from 270 to 275, erected sturdy walls (13
feet thick, and 24 feet high266) around Rome—a city previously regarded as impenetrable—to
protect the city from possible attack. Ancient Roman historians have described the pandemic as
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a trigger for the invasions Rome faced along many corners of the empire, as well as a reason for
Rome’s struggle to contain the threat.267 According to Herodian, wars against the barbarians
were “no longer struggles to secure the frontiers but to save the very existence of the Empire.”268
The dangers the empire faced in the wake of the Cyprian Plague came from all directions—Italy,
Greece, Spain, Mesopotamia, and Syria—and posed serious threats to the stability of the empire,
generating permanent changes in Rome’s military strategy and warfare.

Social and Political Changes
In the fifty years following Philip the Arab’s assassination, Rome was ruled by more than
twenty emperors.269 The political climate of the empire was remarkably unstable: many thirdcentury authors were astonished by the “quick change of emperors, raised to power by violence
and killed shortly afterwards.”270 Roman politics came to be defined by high turnover rates, as
leaders typically either died from plague or assassination by their political opponents. Alföldy
laments that “Justice, fairness, and security were, on the whole, lost.”271 Ancient Romans such
as Cassius Dio and Herodian lamented the rise of a new type of emperor in Rome, who ruled in
an increasingly authoritarian and militaristic manner, and how “rulers became ‘bad’ or even
worse” from the traditional viewpoint.272 Claudius II’s rule from 268-270 CE marked the
beginning of an era often referred to as the “age of the barracks emperors.” This age was marked
by power struggles, as each emperor came into power because of their military prowess and
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popularity with their troops, only to be “discarded or assassinated when favor was ultimately
lost.”273
The relations of the Roman military, state, and society experienced systemic reorganization in the years following the Cyprian Plague. The army became, arguably, the most
important factor in politics. Social mobility increased, and men of lower social backgrounds
became eligible for senatorial posts.274 Alfoldy goes so far to assert that Rome’s “old social
order was believed to be largely lost.”275 The moneyed aristocracy who had previously
controlled the Roman Senate lost a considerable amount of their political power. During his
reign, Gallienus repealed the high position of legionary commander (legatus legionis) and
prohibited senators from pursuing military careers.276 Professional soldiers replaced senators in
their coveted positions of high military commands, breaking with an ancient sociopolitical
tradition that had remained intact since the late Roman Republic. Emperors and wealthy military
commanders paid their troops handsomely in gold to assure loyalty to their commander over the
Roman state. The majority of soldiers who replaced the “moneyed Mediterranean aristocracy”277
hailed from the Danube—a small northern corner of the Roman Empire.
While Gallienus may not have foreseen the full implications of his decision, the
consequences of his reform were explosive, as they worked towards the ultimate militarization
and professionalization of the Roman state bureaucracy.278 Rome became decreasingly
centralized after Philip the Arab’s reign. Although the city of Rome remained respected as the
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“symbolic center” of the Roman Empire,279 the powerful Danubian military officers and
emperors who came into power spent most of their time outside of the city, establishing palaces
and garrison towns along the frontiers where they were fighting.

The Role of Climate
Based on modern scientific research, it has recently been suggested that the changing
climate the Romans experienced in the mid-third century both exacerbated the spread of the
Cyprian Plague and created its own host of social and political issues throughout the empire.
Beginning in the mid-second century, the warm and fertile climate conditions of the Roman
Climate Optimum (RCO) slowly came to an end, bringing about a period known as the Late
Roman Transition (LRT).280 The weather throughout the Roman empire became cooler, drier,
and more variable.281 Aridity intensified, and less rainfall resulted in droughts and infrequent
flooding of the Nile delta.282
Droughts and poor floods parched North Africa from 244 to 248, which quickly proved
to be problematic. Egypt had always been “miraculously fertile” and the “breadbasket of
Rome.”283 Romans had come to depend on levels of agricultural production that relied upon the
unusually good weather conditions during the RCO. And, at a time when the empire needed it
the most, the Nile “abandoned them spectacularly.”284 Pinched for grain, the state had no choice
but to purchase grain from private stores at a high cost. In 248, the Bishop of Alexandria wrote
that the Nile riverbed was “as parched as the desert.”285 The agricultural crisis, drought, and
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famine that the LRT spurred in Egypt caused people to migrate across the empire. In the words
of Harper, these issues amounted “to the severest environmental crisis detectable at any point in
the seven centuries of Roman Egypt.”286 It is possible that the changing global climate may even
have triggered ecological changes that caused the Plague of Cyprian to erupt in the first place.287

Conclusion
While the Plague of Cyprian certainly contributed to what is often referred to as the
“third-century crisis” of the Roman Empire, it is difficult to argue that the plague was the sole
catalyst of the crisis. According to Harper, the profound political and military changes that
occurred in the third century do “not necessarily require a major health crisis to explain why it
happened.”288 While the plague’s correlation with profound societal change should be noted,
given the lack of evidence that has survived from this time period, only so much can be said
about “the possibility of causal links.”289 As Harper writes, the collapse of Rome’s frontiers,
dynasties, and economy “was as much the consequence as the cause of the crisis.”290 With the
collapse of the imperial machine and facing defeat on multiple frontiers in AD 260, Rome’s hope
of survival was abysmal. The concentration of a series of specific and sudden blows pushed the
system of the empire “beyond the threshold of resilience.”291 The ancient Romans themselves
were aware that they were living in a period of crisis, and that these changes “meant present
collapse or future uncertainty for the empire.”292 Barbarian invasions, economic decline, civil
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wars, climate change, and the pestilence all played a role in what some scholars refer to as the
“first fall of Rome”293 at the end of the third century CE.
While the Roman Empire collapsed under the pressures—both internal and external—that
it faced in the third century CE, Rome was not going to give up without a fight. Much to the
amazement of modern scholars, Rome somehow (“almost surprising[ly]”294) managed to
reemerge from the ashes and rebuild itself in the fourth century. Diocletian, who ruled Rome as
emperor from AD 284 to 305, put an end to the disastrous phase of Roman history regarded as
the “Military Anarchy.”295 In an attempt to suppress civil war and political violence, Diocletian
established a tetrarchy, in which four politicians collectively ruled and carried out the duties of
emperor. The political and economic reforms of Diocletian, and his successor Constantine, “set
the scene for the Roman Empire’s comeback act.”296 The Mediterranean climate stabilized for
the time being, and there were no major volcanic eruptions until the early fifth century. Under
Constantine’s rule, in 330, the capital of the Roman Empire was transferred from Rome to
Byzantium, which was soon named Constantinople in Constantine’s honor. In less than a
century, Constantinople’s population multiplied ten-fold, from 30,000 to 300,000 residents.297 In
the two centuries following the Cyprian Plague, under prudent leadership, propitious climate
conditions, and reprieve from savage microbes, the Roman Empire was revitalized. For the time
being, at least.
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THE JUSTINIANIC PLAGUE (541 CE)

Background
In 470 CE, Germanic tribes sacked the city of Rome, overtaking the western portion of
the Roman Empire. By the end of the fifth century, the city of Rome was sparsely populated; a
shadow of its former glory. While Italy and much of the western Roman Empire had effectively
become “frontier province[s],”298 the eastern Roman Empire had—at least for the time being—
managed to ward off external threats to its territories. In the east, Constantinople, also referred
to as ancient Byzantium, soon became the new capital and center of power of the Roman Empire.
Although the eastern Mediterranean had become the empire’s new “heartland,”299 it is worth
clarifying that the empire’s inhabitants continued to refer to themselves as Romans; “Byzantine”
is merely “an intervention of early modern scholarship.”300 The eastern portion of the empire
continued to tackle threats to its borders in every direction, the most formidable of which were
the Persians and the Huns. In 502, confrontation between the Roman Empire and Persia erupted
into war. The Huns, steppe-dwellers of central Asia and nomadic horsemen who also posed a
threat to the security of the empire, were paid an annual indemnity in exchange for their peace.301
Justinian, who ruled as emperor from 527 to 565, made peace with Persia and sought to
reconquer the western territories that had formerly been part of the Roman Empire. The first half
of Justinian’s reign “was a flurry of action virtually unparalleled in Roman history.”302 In
addition to Justinian’s armies successfully reclaiming large swaths of western territories,
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Justinian reformed the bureaucracy of the empire, working tirelessly to make the legal and
political systems of the empire more equitable and efficient than they were previously.303
Justinian completely revised and codified all Roman law, an immense undertaking which had not
previously been attempted. He embarked on an ambitious building spree, commissioning the
construction of more than thirty churches around Constantinople (including the resplendent
Hagia Sophia), as well as the construction of bridges, and several underground cisterns to ensure
a stable water supply for the people of Constantinople. With the population of Constantinople
approaching 500,000 individuals, “food security was nothing to take for granted.”304 As emperor,
Justinian was obligated to feed his people, and he frequently traveled across the Roman world to
inspect the state’s granaries. For the first half of Justinian’s reign, ships traveling from
Alexandria carried more than 300,000 liters of wheat to Constantinople per year.305 From
Constantinople, grain was distributed by land and sea to distant areas across the Roman Empire.
Granaries were omnipresent in the late Roman world, as it was believed important to stockpile
large quantities of grain—as a mechanism to both feed those unable to afford it, as well as to
provide a buffer in years where crops failed. Rome’s network of granaries was a failsafe in time
of famine, as grain could be dispersed to feed individuals anywhere in the empire.
However, grain was not the only thing being transported across the Mediterranean seas
on ships—or carted along roads—bound for distant areas of the Empire. Somewhere along the
way, something else had managed to hitch a ride: the black rat (Rattus rattus). This comes as
little surprise given the omnipresence of rats in Constantinople and across the Roman Empire.
Solid archaeological evidence for the prevalence of rats in the ancient Roman world has been
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unearthed in recent years, in the form of gnawing marks on bones, rat remains in the pellets of
owls and other predators, and rat remains “preserved in situ.”306 Constantinople itself has been
coined a “rat paradise” by modern scholars because of its ample granaries and opportunities for
rats to travel and reproduce.307 Left with an unlimited food supply, “rats proliferate
famously.”308 As if the rats’ infiltration of the empire’s grain supply alone wasn’t sufficiently
problematic (they consumed or damaged up to 15% of the grain supply they made their way
into309), the rats were carrying a newly-mutated bacterium in their blood—Yersinia pestis.
Before succumbing to disease themselves, black rats are able to store high concentrations of the
Y. pestis bacterium in their bloodstreams, which, with the help of fleas, is quickly transmitted to
adjacent human populations. The fur of black rats is home to small fleas that drink their blood,
the most common of which in the sixth century was the oriental rat flea (Xenopsylla cheopis).
Fleas become infected after ingesting the blood of infected rats, and when fleas bite humans or
other animals, they spread the infection—Bubonic Plague—to them.

Origin, Timeline, and Geographical Reach
According to Procopius of Caesarea, the Bubonic plague epidemic, which has often been
referred to as the Justinianic Plague, began in Pelusium, a Mediterranean port located on the
easternmost branch of the Nile delta.310 Pelusium and Alexandria were the two major Egyptian
ports on the Mediterranean, and both “communicated with the Nile through a network of
canals.”311 The fact that the plague arrived in Pelusium in 541, prior to striking Alexandria,
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suggests that it originated from the Red Sea, which is directly south of Pelusium. Individuals
contemporary with the outbreak of Bubonic plague, such as John of Ephesus and Evagrius
Scholasticus, also traced the Plague of Justinian to the Red Sea.312 After the plague reached
Pelusium, both the ancients and modern scholars agree that it diffused throughout the
Mediterranean in both eastward (via Palestine and Levant) and westward (along the north
African coast) directions, traveling along various trade routes.313 However, where the plague
originated from prior to its arrival at the Red Sea continues to be a hot topic of debate among
scholars. Modern scientific findings and DNA analyses may go a long way in settling this
debate.
Until recently, most historians believed that the Justinianic Plague originated from the
Great Lakes region of Central Africa. Peter Sarris, in 2002, concluded that “an African origin to
the bubonic plague” was the most plausible “both chronologically and geopolitically.”314 More
than a decade later, in 2013, A. D. Lee wrote that the 541 outbreak of Bubonic plague was likely
to have come from Central Africa.315 However, while it is true that Yersinia pestis was endemic
to the Great Lakes region of Central Africa prior to the sixth century, the specific strain of Y.
pestis currently present in the Great Lakes region “is not the descendant of the germ that caused
the first plague pandemic beginning in 542 CE,” according to George W. Sussman’s research
published in 2015.316 After analyzing ancient DNA, Sussman concluded that the Y. pestis strain
responsible for the Justinianic Plague originated in Asia rather than Africa.317 Thus, the specific
strain of Y. pestis that caused the Plague of Justinian must have come to the Red Sea from the
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East, as China was the birthplace of the pathogen. In support of an Asian entry point, Tsiamis et
al. write that “The suggestion that the port of Clysma [which is located due south of Pelusium],
and no other port of the Red Sea, could have acted as the gateway of the plague is supported by a
series of historical events.”318 Harper, too, argued that the plague originated from the uplands of
western China, based on DNA evidence.319 Some scientists have yet to accept these new
findings: according to Mischa Meier in 2016, the debate surrounding whether the plague
originated from Africa or China “remains open,” and at present “there is no absolute certainty to
be had.”320
After arriving in Pelusium in 540, the Justinianic Plague emerged in Egypt in 541,
diffusing across trade routes and eventually reaching Constantinople, Jerusalem, Antioch, and
Syria in 542. The plague entered Rome in late 543. Coastal cities were hit “first and hardest,”321
as the Y. pestis-infected rats first traveled by sea on ships sailing across the Mediterranean; soon
they disembarked and were carted along the roads of the empire alongside grain. As the plague
spread across the Mediterranean world from 541-544, it eventually became endemic to the
region, consequently flaring up in various waves in different areas for the next two centuries.322
The first wave of Bubonic plague in Constantinople lasted until 544, whereupon Justinian issued
Novel 122, “wherein he declared the plague’s ravage as terminated.”323 The subsequent waves
occurred in the years: 558, 573, 590, 597, 618.324 After the 618 epidemic, sources describing
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the outbreak of Bubonic plague become increasingly sparse; few records have survived in an
interpretable form.325 Between 540 and 750, the Justinianic pandemic “recurred in some 18
waves,”326 striking the capital at Constantinople every fifteen years on average for the first
century of its outbreak.327 After 620, the plague only struck the capital every 64 years on
average, which suggests the “waning dominance of Constantinople in the eastern
Mediterranean,”328 as the city came to play an increasingly peripheral role in the region, and as a
result, later outbreaks of Bubonic plague rarely made their way to the capital.
While the Mediterranean stood as the epicenter for outbreaks of Justinianic Plague,
ancient sources evince that the plague traveled all over the known world: to Spain, Gaul, the
French-German border, Britain, and Ireland. As stated by Michael W. Dols, “the pandemic
engulfed the lands and peoples of the known world.”329 It struck large urban areas and distant
countrysides alike. Studies of various European countrysides from the sixth to eighth centuries
indicate that “plague was as active there as in the cities.”330 As peasants comprised the majority
of the Roman army, many brought the plague back home with them from war. Moreover, heavy
mortalities across the countryside may explain the severe manpower shortages that the army
faced in the late sixth and seventh centuries.
The plague struck Spain first in 542 and again in 584. It arrived in the British Isles in 544
or 545, soon appearing in Ireland. There are only two recorded instances of the plague having
traveled to mainland England, both of which were described by the contemporary British author
Bede: 664-666 and 684.331 Newly unearthed archaeological evidence suggests that the
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Justinianic Plague made its way to areas beyond what has been observed in written records, i.e.,
Bavaria. Less than two decades ago, researchers genotyped material from putative Justinianic
Plague victims buried in a 6th century graveyard in Aschheim, which is located in Bavaria,
Germany. More than four hundred individuals were buried in the cemetery.332 Analyzing the
dental pulp DNA of several skeletons buried in the cemetery, researchers found that some had
been infected with Y. pestis bacteria, a discovery which confirmed Y. pestis’ role as the causative
agent of the Justinianic Plague.333 Moreover, the fact that Y. pestis journeyed through transalpine
Europe—to a region for which there is no written documentation indicating the presence of
Bubonic plague—suggests that the Bubonic plague may have stretched far beyond the
geographical boundaries that have previously been established for the disease purely on the basis
of written evidence from the time.

The Role of Climate
While the Mediterranean climate had been relatively tranquil and stable in the years
leading up to Justinian’s rule, in 526 climatic conditions began to degenerate rapidly. In 526, an
earthquake in Antioch claimed the lives of more than a quarter of a million people. A decade
later, in 536, the sky went dark for more than a year: John of Ephesus wrote that “the sun
became dark and its darkness lasted for one and a half years … the fruits did not ripen, and the
wine tasted like sour grapes.”334 Procopius provided a similar account, writing that “the sun
gave forth its light without brightness, like the moon, during this whole year.”335 Witnesses as
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distant as eastern China chronicle the same observations recorded by the Roman eyewitnesses.336
While some debate has persisted as to whether the dust veil that darkened the skies of the
northern hemisphere was caused by volcanic eruptions or the impact of a comet, the detrimental
environmental impacts of the cloud on Roman society are clear.
According to scholars like Antii Arjava, “the dust veil has been declared the worst
climatic disaster in recorded times.”337 Temperatures fell between 1.5 to 2.5 degrees Celsius,
making the decade from 536 to 545 the coldest on record in the past two millennia.338 Crops
failed and people starved. Both people and animals began to migrate in search of food, venturing
beyond their typical radii of travel. Animals began to move in unusual migratory patterns.339 It
is possible that the behavioral changes in animals that were caused by such unexpected and
unprecedented climate change may also have been responsible for bringing Bubonic plague to
the Mediterranean world in the first place. Changing temperatures and precipitation may have
prompted rodents carrying Y. pestis to abandon their habitats, possibly triggering “an epizootic
that reached the rodents of the seaborne trade routes heading west.”340
The famine triggered by the lack of crops that would grow under worsening climate
conditions may also have contributed to the spread of the plague; as grain had to be transported
from granaries across the empire to remote villages, the infected rats who had climbed aboard
arrived with the grain, thereby spreading the plague even further. While these changes to the
Mediterranean climate, caused by unusual geological—and perhaps meteorological—activity,
stretched resources thin and wrought havoc across the agricultural and zoological landscape, in

336

Yeomans, “Pandemics, Climate and the Fall of the Roman Empire.”
Arjava, “The Mystery Cloud of 536 CE in the Mediterranean Sources,” 74.
338
Gibbons, “Why 536 Was ‘the Worst Year to Be Alive.’”
339
Stathakopoulos, “Crime and Punishment: The Plague in the Byzantine Empire, 541-749,” 100.
340
Harper, The Fate of Rome, 219.
337

74
and of themselves they did not elicit social collapse or state failure. Instead, they piled stress
onto an economy whose finances and resources had already been strained by years of intense
warfare on multiple fronts.

Symptoms, Ancient Medicine, and Modern Medical Assessment
The symptomologies of Justinianic Plague described by various contemporary authors are
markedly similar, matching classic symptoms of Bubonic plague: fever, and buboes in areas
near the lymph nodes. Unlike with respect to the three earlier epidemics described in this paper,
there is little debate regarding the modern diagnosis of the Justinianic Plague. Modern scholars
overwhelmingly concur that Bubonic plague is the culprit.341 The plague reared its head in three
different forms: bubonic, pneumonic, and septic. Historians and scientists concur that Y. pestis
was the bacterium responsible for the plague, and archaeological evidence from the time
supports this conclusion. Thus, according to Robert Sallares, the main point of uncertainty
regarding the symptoms of the Justinianic Plague is “the relative importance of the bubonic,
pneumonic, and septicemic forms of the disease.”342
The bubonic form of the plague occurred when an individual was bit by a flea infected
with the Y. pestis bacterium. The individual’s lymphatic system, in an attempt to purge the body
of the bacterium, drained it into nearby lymph nodes, where the bacterium then dodged the
body’s immune response and replicated rapidly.343 Individuals bitten by an infected flea became
symptomatic within three to five days, quickly developing a fever, chills, and a headache.344
About a day later, buboes began to form on their skin, typically near individuals’ armpits, ears,
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thighs, or groin. Some had bloody and swollen eyes, a sore throat, or diarrhea. Death was
imminent after the pustules on an individual’s skin turned black.
The Y. pestis bacterium could also be transmitted via aerosol droplets expelled by
infected individuals. The incubation period of pneumonic plague was shorter than bubonic,
lasting only 2-3 days. Victims became sick with bronchitis and pneumonia, experiencing fever,
chest pain, and a bloody cough. Pneumonic plague was even more fatal than plague in its
bubonic form—the former having a case fatality rate approaching 100%, while the latter had a
fatality rate of around 80 percent.345
In other cases, the Y. pestis bacterium skipped the lymphatic route of the infected
altogether, and instead traveled directly into the bloodstream. Individuals infected with
septicemic plague died of “overwhelming sepsis” even before signs of the disease presented
themselves externally, often collapsing dead within hours of initial infection.346 The few
individuals who managed to survive the Justinianic Plague were left with long-lasting and
debilitating side effects, ranging from gangrene to brain damage, which could result in a “violent
delirium.”347 And, having survived one round of the plague did not even guarantee immunity
from future infection: for most, the plague bacterium conferred “only partial and temporary
immunity.”348
While there exists no record of a Galen-equivalent doctor during the Justinianic Plague,
there were a few notable changes in medical care that occurred in response to the outbreak of the
Justinianic Plague. Hospitals continued to be constructed and existing ones were expanded.349
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Physicians conducted autopsies of the bodies of those who had died from the plague and lanced
the bubonic swellings of the corpses. They discovered that something strange had grown inside
(likely the remains of swollen, hemorrhaged lymph nodes), yet their medical understanding was
so slim that these investigations did little to advance their understanding of the plague or its
spread.350 According to one historian contemporary with the plague, doctors “were at a complete
loss concerning the circumstances of the pest.”351 Thus, while the plague invited a clinical
examination, which many doctors engaged in, such examination unfortunately “yielded little
benefit to scientific medicine.”352

Analysis of Contemporary Accounts
A wide range of sources—written by authors contemporary with the Plague of
Justinian— from various geographical, social, and cultural perspectives have survived. The
three most detailed contemporary descriptions are those of Procopius of Caesarea, John of
Ephesus, and Evagrius Scholasticus. Procopius reported the symptoms of the plague
methodically and in a “true classicising style” that echoes Thucydides’ 431 BCE account of the
Plague of Athens.353 John of Ephesus, a Syrian monk who traveled through Palestine, Syria,
Mesopotamia, and Asia Minor during the plague, provided an emotional account and religious
interpretation of the disease’s outbreak.354 Finally Evagrius Scholasticus, a church historian and
secretary to Patriarch Gregory of Antioch, offered a personal account of the suffering caused by
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the disease, as most of his household fell ill and eventually succumbed to the Justinianic
Plague.355
In the absence of germ theory, the arrival and cause of the Justinianic Plague baffled
contemporary authors. Many turned to religion in search of an explanation: Procopius wrote
that “it is impossible to conceive in thought any explanation, except indeed to refer it to God.”356
John of Ephesus viewed the plague as divine chastisement, writing that God’s anger had fallen
upon cities like a “wine-press and pitilessly trampled and squeezed all their inhabitants within
them like fine grapes.”357 Yet, as the plague attacked the pious and impious alike, religion
became a dissatisfying explanation. The majority of Evagrius’ household having died from the
plague proved “enough to lead even a churchman into doubt,” as he openly questioned whether
or not God was just.358 Procopius, writing around 550 CE, seems to have considered a more
scientific analysis as well, listing “the variables that could be excluded as causal factors:
geography, ethnicity, season, gender, age, habitat, lifestyle, temperament, activities.”359

Mortality Estimates
Across the Mediterranean world, and in Constantinople in particular, people dropped
dead from disease almost instantaneously. The vast scale of deaths quickly proved previously
accepted corpse disposal practices to be impractical and inadequate. Dead bodies filled the
streets, piling up “without enough survivors left to bury them.”360 Corpses were left on the
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streets for days before they were finally collected for burial.361 The putrid stench of death wafted
throughout the city. With mortality rates at an unprecedented high, traditional burial practices
were soon abandoned. According to John of Ephesus, “no one ventured outside without an
identity tag,”362 as individuals feared they would be left unburied if they died while out and
about. The wealthy took matters into their own hands, violating the tombs of individuals who
had been buried prior to the outbreak of plague in order to bury their own dead in their place.363
Burial customs, such as the simultaneous burial of multiple bodies in larger graves, which had
been “very hard to document” prior to the sixth century, became commonplace.364 As corpses
continued to be heaped into stacks on the streets or tossed into the waterways, Justinian was
forced to intervene, appointing a man named Theodore as imperial official to organize the
collection and disposal of the dead. Justinian also arranged for mass burial pits (each could
accommodate around 70,000 bodies) to be dug at Sycae, a suburb of Constantinople.365
Mortalities were so high that, according to Procopius, gravediggers removed the roofs of the
towers that comprised the wall surrounding the Constantinopolitan suburb of Galata in 542, and
stacked corpses into each tower before reattaching the roofs.366 We are told that the stench was
insufferable.
The lack of demographical data from the sixth-century Roman Empire has made it
difficult to estimate the overall mortality of the 542 epidemic and its subsequent—more poorly
attested—outbreaks. Eyewitnesses emphasized heavy death tolls: John of Ephesus wrote that, at
the height of the plague in Constantinople, more than 16,000 individuals were dying per day, and
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that the men standing outside the gates of Constantinople stopped counting the number of
corpses taken for burial after the tally reached 230,000.367 Procopius wrote that the mortality of
the Justinianic Plague exceeded 10,000 per day, proclaiming that “the whole human race came
near to being annihilated.”368 Modern scholars caution against the urge to take these ancient
estimates at face value; Mischa Meier argues that “the intention of the authors probably was not
to provide a precise quantitative record in the modern sense but rather primarily to convey the
quality of the event, the monstrousness of its dimensions.”369
Thus, while an exact measure of the death toll has continued to elude modern scholars,
most agree that a reasonable estimate for the mortality rate of the Justinianic Plague lies
somewhere between 30 and 60 percent. Josiah C. Russell has hypothesized that the Justinianic
Plague caused a 40-50 percent drop in the population of the eastern Roman Empire between the
years 541 and 600.370 According to John of Ephesus, mortality in Constantinople was higher
than in any other city or countryside of the empire.371 Given Constantinople’s status as a center
for commerce and culture—as the largest and most cosmopolitan city of the Roman Empire—
scholars tend to agree with John’s assessment. With an estimated population of around half a
million individuals in 540, an assumed 50-60 percent mortality rate in Constantinople for the
first wave of Justinianic Plague, 250,000-300,000 fatalities would fall in line with the betterknown death rates of the Black Death, another episode of Bubonic Plague that struck Eurasia in
the fourteenth century.372 Both P. Allen and Ann Gibbons have posited that the bubonic plague
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wiped out ⅓ to ½ of the population of the eastern Roman Empire.373 According to Michael S.
Rosenwald, the Justinianic Plague is believed to have caused somewhere between thirty and fifty
millions deaths between 541 and 750 CE.374 While scholars do not entirely agree on the exact
figure or range of mortality, Meier points out that if the fatality of the Justinianic Plague
occurred “on anything even approaching” a scale of 25 percent, “it must inevitably have had
massive, indeed devastating effects on every aspect of politics, the economy, religion, and
war.”375

Social Changes
The seemingly infinite cycle of natural disaster and disease had a tempestuous
psychological effect on many individuals. Demographic decline resulting from a combination of
recurring waves of plague and natural disaster greatly changed the landscape of the empire as the
Romans had once known it: in Pope Gregory’s Rome (c. 590 AD), there many have been as few
as 10,000-20,000 individuals living in the city, which “would barely have filled a corner of the
Colosseum.”376
Traditional social order collapsed. The indiscriminatory and unpredictable nature of the
plague, which killed some while sparing others, and extinguished entire villages while leaving
neighboring towns completely unscathed for no clear reason, drove contemporaries mad. In
some cities, post-traumatic stress disorder gave way to mass hysteria: ancient authors recount a
“collective madness” that struck several cities—Constantinople, Constantina, Edessa, Carrhae,
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Martyropolis, and Amida—in 560.377 “Full-blown mass hysteria” arose in Constantinople.378
Individuals “howled”379 and took flight whenever they encountered a monk, priest, or other
religious official, as they suspected them of being “death incarnate.”380 Rumor and hysteria ran
rampant; according to John of Ephesus, “a sane person could no longer be found easily.”381 The
Life of St. Theodore of Sikyeon, written about the Byzantine Saint, “contains numerous tales of
the saint exorcising demons when whole communities became possessed.”382 Each subsequent
wave of plague for the next two centuries brought with it recurring waves of hysteria,
devastation, and instability; Lester K. Little writes that “the challenge for leaders everywhere
was to keep communities together.”383
Demographic settlement patterns across urban and rural areas of the empire shifted in
response to mass mortality and rapidly changing economic conditions. The persistence of the
plague for two centuries created “a prolonged epoch of demographic stagnation.”384 The
population of the Roman Empire contracted and did not rebound for several centuries. Building
projects across the empire all but ceased in the wake of the 541 outbreak of plague.385 While
archaeological records from the time are scant, it is clear that the earthquake of 526 and
subsequent earthquakes inflicted devastating damage on architectural sites across the empire.
Although the evidence that has survived may be insufficient to conclude with absolute certainty
that individuals left highly populated plague-infested areas and relocated to the countryside, “it
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may well point to that,” according to Hugh N. Kennedy.386 An archaeological survey of the
main houses in Apamea—the capital of Syria II—has discovered that, by the end of the sixthcentury, all but one of the houses “had been deserted or at least were in a state of decay.”387 This
was likely due to some combination of earthquake damage, plague, and the Persian conquests of
573. In Kennedy’s opinion, the sixth-century archaeological evidence that has been unearthed in
Syria “is entirely consistent with a pandemic that caused massive loss of life on repeated
occasions.”388

Religious Changes
Despite the continuity of “Roman” terminology with which the residents of the empire
used to refer to themselves and their lands, decades had passed since the city of Rome itself was
truly the center of the empire.389 The character of the Roman Empire had fundamentally
changed, as Rome was “now a strongly Christianised society.”390 Imperial campaigns in the
decades prior to the outbreak of the Bubonic plague had sought to purge the empire of paganism
and persuade—at times through the use of force—individuals to convert to Christianity. John of
Ephesus, for example, alongside “gangs of monks,” raided pagan villages in Asia Minor and
destroyed pagan altars and temples.391 As the mortality of the Justinianic Plague continued to
climb, and as individuals died ubiquitously, the “full apocalyptical potential” of the religious
atmosphere was triggered.392 Many believed the end was near; no amount of prayer or religious
devotion (to any religion) could save an individual from imminent death.
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The first distinctive religious response to the plague was repaganization, whereby many
Christians reverted to worship of the pagan gods. Presuming that the Christian God had done
nothing to spare their communities from suffering or death, some turned and prayed to the old
pagan gods in search of their protection. Unfortunately, this not only attracted the ire of the
primarily Christian imperial authorities, but it also did nothing to protect the people from the
plague: John of Ephesus described how “the plague-afflicted residents of a Palestinian village
briefly reverted to the worship of pagan images and received terrible punishment from God.”393
While some Christians turned to paganism, another popular religious response was to
worship saints and other holy figures within the Christian faith with the hope that they might
“intercede with God for the cessation of the scourge and cure them of it.”394 As prayers to the
Christian God were unsuccessful, they caused some individuals to lose faith in “traditional
guardians” of the Christian religion.395 Rather than calling the entire religion into doubt,
individuals instead attempted to “place their salvation in the hands of new protectors.”396
Worship of the Virgin Mary increased again, as it had in the wake of the Cyprian Plague. This is
evidenced by the transformation of an annual festival—which had historically been held in honor
of Christ—to a festival in celebration of the Virgin in 542, “expressly as a measure to alleviate
the plague.”397 Although Christians had hitherto rejected it in every form, because they viewed it
as a perpetuation of pagan religious practices, icons of venerated saints and religious figures
“began to appear abundantly” in private and public spaces in the second half of the sixth
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century.398 The timing of this uptick in iconolatry directly coincides with the exogenous
disasters that afflicted the eastern Roman empire during this time.
An intensification in Christian piety in response to the Justinianic Plague also manifested
itself in the continuation of church construction projects throughout times of economic scarcity,
as well as through a spectacular increase in monasticism. In the two centuries during which the
plague swept through the empire, church construction became the “most active form of public
construction.”399 More monasteries were built with increased capacity to accommodate a larger
number of monks.400 Without any sense of germ theory, practices of monastic life created
conditions ripe for disease spread. John Maddicott writes that “there could hardly have been a
more innocently lethal act of charity than the kiss of peace” that Abbot Eosterwine gave every
monk of the Wearmouth monastery as he lay dying of Bubonic plague in 686.401 More than
simply providing a passive arena for the plague’s spread within the residential structure,
however, monks’ frequent visits to nearby villages are likely to have spread the disease far
beyond the physical boundaries of the monastery.
According to Jo N. Hays, the period of the Justinianic Plague was “an age of shifting
religious domination and contested grounds” between Christianity, paganism, Judaism, and
Islam.402 During the time that Bubonic plague was endemic to Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and
Iran (from the late sixth century CE onwards), Islam began to spread through these regions. As
the plague severely weakened the eastern portion of the Roman Empire and accelerated the
decline of the Persian Empire, it scarcely afflicted the nomadic Arab tribes—many of which had

398

Ibid, 286.
Harper, The Fate of Rome, 279.
400
Little, “Life and Afterlife of the First Plague Pandemic,” 27.
401
Maddicott, “Plague in Seventh-Century England,” 188-189.
402
Hays, “Historians and Epidemics: Simple Questions, Complex Answers,” 41.
399

85
converted to Islam—who were traveling through these regions, typically through desert-like
terrain.403 Thus, while the rest of the population was relatively stationary during the various
outbursts of Bubonic plague, Islamic nomadic tribes continued to travel throughout the Middle
East and shared their religious beliefs with those they encountered, and as a result were able to
spread their religion.

Political Changes
While the first decade of Justinian’s reign—prior to the arrival of Bubonic plague—was
remarkably successful and prosperous, his administration grappled with “a preponderance of
setbacks”404 in the years following the outbreak of plague. Justinian’s ambitious programs of
reform and military conquests, which may very well have been successful under normal
circumstances, were complicated by natural disaster, plague, and consecutive years of bad
harvests. According to Harper, the 540 plague inaugurated “what has been called ‘the other age
of Justinian.”405 Although Justinian’s personal character, work ethic, and proactivity were
exemplary by all measures, the critical question, according to Lee, “is whether his initiatives and
efforts ultimately benefited the empire or not.”406 Extensive military campaigning exhausted
imperial financial reserves, making the treasury desperate for revenue. The high death toll
merely added to the burden. Thus, while Justinian may have wanted to restore the greatness of
the Roman empire by seeking to evoke large societal change and reconquering territories that
had previously been the core of the empire, his ambitious programs further complicated the

403

Sabbatani, Manfredi, and Fiorino, “The Justinian Plague (Part Two). Influence of the Epidemic on the Rise of the
Islamic Empire.”
404
Lee, “Justinian and the End of Antiquity,” 295.
405
Harper, The Fate of Rome, 206.
406
Lee, “Justinian and the End of Antiquity,” 295.

86
issues that the state faced from the exogenous events of the 540s. Justinian’s reign “trundled
forward in the shadow of pestilence.”407 His rule came to be defined by the grave exogenous
events that occurred during his time as emperor, which he could do little to mitigate the damage
of. This, along with a “series of unfortunate events”408 late in Justinian’s reign, such as food
shortages, protests, assassination attempts, and natural disasters, caused contemporaries to regard
him contemptively and often harshly criticize his leadership and apparent poor control of the
Roman state.409

Economic Impact
Economic life across the empire—and in Constantinople in particular—came grounding
to a halt. Across the countrysides of the empire, grapes rotted on the vine, herds went untended,
and crops unharvested. With few individuals left who were either willing or able to work,
buying and selling all but ceased.410 Marketplaces closed after running out of food. According
to Allen, the primary effects of the 542 outbreak of Bubonic plague were “famine and
inflation.”411 In an economy that was primarily agricultural, the dire lack of agrarian labor at
harvest time “had disastrous consequences.”412 The agricultural challenges the Romans faced
were exacerbated by the fact that the pestilence was not confined to humans: it attacked and
killed off cattle and other animals, further contributing to food shortages and hindering
production. As labor had become increasingly scarce while demand rose, “tradesmen, artisans,
and agricultural workers” began to demand prices and wages two to three times more than what
407
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had previously been considered the norm.413 Justinian was quick to respond, introducing price
control legislation in 545 and urging employers to pay workers their customary wages rather than
the newly-inflated rates.
The government’s demand for tax revenue remained constant in the wake of the
Justinianic Plague, as the physical size of the empire and demands made on the state by warfare
on multiple frontiers had remained the same. However, the imperial need for tax revenue
quickly proved to be problematic; as the taxpayer base of the empire had contracted significantly
due to plague mortalities, the average individual tax burden increased considerably. Justinian
made no taxation concessions to landowners, despite the fact that many were already suffering
financially as a result of the epidemic.414 The imperial taxation program proved so burdensome
that some farmers fled to escape paying taxes on their unproductive land.415 Justinian’s
response? Landowners were soon required to pay annual taxes on both their own land, as well as
on plots of neighboring land that had been abandoned.416 Such a taxation policy devastated the
poorer landholding classes, while working to the advantage of the wealthy, who could not only
afford to pay their increased tax obligations but also stood to gain financially from increased
assets and owning more land that they could work and turn a profit on. As stated by John
Atkinson, the chaotic economic conditions brought about by the plague created “the potential for
both the enrichment of the wealthy who survived, and some measure of redistribution of
wealth.”417 Yet even the financial position of the wealthy was not particularly stable. Sudden,
widespread death threw the inheritance system into disarray. And, in a formerly advanced
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economy with modern financial credit systems, “banks were desperate to enforce debt
obligations on successors.”418
Pinched for revenue, the Roman state overhauled the imperial currency system. Around
542-3, a time period that coincides with the “first ravages”419 of the Bubonic plague, Justinian
issued a series of lightweight solidi coins, many of which weighed 20 siliquae (24 had previously
been customary).420 It is likely that the administration minted poorer-quality gold and copper
coins in response to the drastic fall in state revenues. Michael Metcalf’s study concluded that,
between the years of 538 and 551, the weight of copper coinage minted throughout the empire
decreased by nearly 25 percent.421 The cumulative blow of multiple waves of plague had a
debilitating impact on Ancient Rome’s state finances and financial systems. Justinian’s
successor—Justin II, who reigned from 565 to 578—lamented the “exhausted” and debtburdened treasury he had inherited.422 The financial crisis became so great that imperial
authorities had no choice but to reduce military pay by 25 percent in 588.423 Rome’s inability to
finance and pay its military to the same extent as it had prior to the outbreak of plague quickly
proved to be problematic as the empire faced threats from neighboring territories on multiple
fronts.

Impact on Military
Justinian’s crusades to reconquer the western territories of the empire—while initially
successful—stretched thin the financial resources and military capacity of the Roman Empire.
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Given the close living quarters soldiers experienced in camps, the Roman armies sustained “the
maximum mortality rate” from the Justinianic Plague.424 The disruption that the epidemic of the
540s caused to Rome’s military campaigns was enormous: imperial commanders struggled with
manpower shortages and an inability to pay even the scant number of troops they were able to
rally. In 552, Justinian’s armies managed to defeat Totila, thereby regaining control of Italy.425
But Justinian did not stop there. He continued to campaign across the western Mediterranean,
sending troops to fight the Moors in North Africa and intervening in a civil war in Spain.426
Earlier in his reign, many of Justinian’s peace treaties stipulated monetary payments from the
Roman imperial treasury to areas that posed a threat to the Empire. However, in the aftermath of
the Justinianic Plague, this tactic proved to be unsustainable; Lee argues that while Justinian’s
monetary payments were successful in the short-term, they may have handicapped the empire’s
military strategy and resources in the long term, as the fiscal crises brought about by the plague
made it difficult for the empire to afford the sums it had agreed to pay to its enemies during a
time of relative economic prosperity and stability.427
Justinian’s commitment of imperial forces to multiple theatres of war created a
predicament. After the Justinianic Plague, the state could neither field the army that its vast
domain and multiple fronts of perpetual warfare required, nor could it afford to pay such an
army. Debasing the currency—a gambit often used by other leaders at times when state finances
were pressed—was no longer an option, as gold currency had become the “gold standard” and
was now the only form of payment troops accepted.428 According to Harper, in times of
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financial duress, the state had two options: either to withhold pay from soldiers, or to squeeze
taxpayers.429 During the 540s, the empire often did both. In the 570s, Roman Emperor Tiberius
II was forced to resort to desperate enlistment campaigns across the empire to increase the size of
the army. In 588, imperial authorities formally reduced military pay by 25 percent.
The initial outbreak of Bubonic plague in the 540s and subsequent outbreaks severely
debilitated the eastern Roman Empire and the might of its military forces. The mortality and
fiscal crisis occasioned by the plague severely weakened the empire “in the decades leading up
to the final dramatic phase of Byzantine-Persian warfare in the early seventh century,” according
to Sarris.430 In 626, the Persians, having conquered much of the Eastern Roman Empire, made
their ways to the walls of Constantinople. With the capture of Constantinople, along with large
swaths of eastern territories, the “last great zone of energy” of the Roman Empire was lost.431
The Mediterranean world as Rome had once known it was no more—the empire was spliced into
smaller pieces which were claimed by various surrounding leaders. Such severe geopolitical
losses caused Rome to morph into “a Byzantine rump state whose straggled possessions were
meager and impoverished.”432 The noxious combination of mortality and financial crisis fueled
by the Justinianic Plague made it impossible for Rome to defend the many frontiers of the empire
against outside intruders.

Conclusion
In spite of heavy mortalities, military losses, political change, social upheaval, and
economic hardship—brought about by the Antonine and Cyprian Plagues—the Roman Empire
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managed to rebuild itself and make a miraculous recovery in the centuries that followed.
Justinian’s rule marked the beginning of an era rife with possibility; that, with a few strategic
military campaigns, Rome might regain its glory and status as a Mediterranean superpower.
These dreams were swept away when disease struck in 542. The damage resulting from the
Justinianic Plague was both disastrous and far-reaching. By the end of the sixth century, Rome
was a shadow of her former self, more than a third of the empire’s population had succumbed to
disease. Grave mortality and economic instability brought about by the plague halted all hopes
of reconquest or restoration of the “old” Roman Empire. There was simply not enough money or
manpower to continue with the aggressive military campaigns that had commenced under
Justinian’s rule. Imperial attempts to ward off threats in multiple directions simultaneously to
preserve Rome’s territorial footprint further weakened the empire. In the end, Rome’s extensive
and aggressive military prowess—which had facilitated the empire’s unparalleled territorial
conquest and dominance throughout the known world—also enkindled her demise.
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CONCLUSION
History and the human experience are inextricably linked to the climate and ecology of
our planet. Often overlooked, pathogens and infectious diseases have profoundly impacted
societies across the world for millennia. In particular, the four major ancient epidemics explored
in this paper wrought immense destruction across the known world. Individually and
cumulatively, the unrelenting pathogens responsible—some with mortality rates above 25
percent—gave rise to conditions that ultimately contributed to the collapse of two of the world’s
greatest empires: Athens and Rome. Economies suffered, military regimes collapsed, and
political turmoil ensued. Changing climate conditions precipitated or exacerbated outbreaks of
infectious disease and created agricultural and economic hardships that, in turn, were further
exacerbated by the outbreak of plague. Societies stricken by disease sought explanations for
their suffering, turning to new religions or religious practices in pursuit of answers that religion
could not provide.
For over 2,000 years, the legacies left by the ancient Athenian and Roman empires have
inspired awe. Athens and Rome were centers of scientific and philosophical inquiry, political
theory, and technological innovation. They were the birthplace of progressive systems of
government and finance that served as models for many other countries. With geographical
footprints that, at times, exceeded the boundaries of the entire Mediterranean, they were hotbeds
of international trade, diplomacy, and triumphant architectural and infrastructure achievements.
Despite lacking the transportation or communication technologies we possess today, the ancient
Athenians and Romans managed to extend and redefine the commercial, political, and
intellectual horizons of their respective empires.
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Yet, in their quest to further expand their power by conquering and colonizing territories
across the Mediterranean and beyond, the ancient Greeks and Romans also may have unleashed
a Pandora’s box of pandemics. Increased travel, migration, and exploration facilitated—and also
intensified—the spread of infectious diseases to nonimmune populations across the known
world. Ancient philosophers had made revolutionary discoveries in mathematics, astronomy,
and engineering. But when it came to plague, they were helpless; the spread of infectious
disease was a matter they simply failed to understand. It took only one plague to tear down
Athens. Rome managed to resist the formidable force of infectious disease twice: despite
suffering heavy mortalities from both the Antonine and Cyprian Plagues, the empire—much to
the astonishment of modern scholars—managed to repopulate, re-stabilize its economy, and
reconquer lost territories. But even the most resilient empire could only sustain so much; with
each subsequent wave of plague, Rome’s efforts to rebuild were reversed. With the Justinianic
Plague, nature’s destructive force rained down, ultimately pushing one of the world’s greatest
empires to the brink of collapse.
While the Plague of Athens, the Antonine Plague, the Cyprian Plague, and the Plague of
Justinian were the four worst outbreaks of infectious disease known to have occurred in ancient
times, they are far from the only widescale outbreaks of infectious disease to have occurred
throughout history. A quick Google search unearths, among other things, a list of “20 of the
worst epidemics and pandemics in history,” many of which had death tolls in the hundreds of
thousands, others in the millions.433 For centuries after the Justinianic Plague, microbes and
viruses have continued to be formidable forces to reckon with. In the absence of Germ theory,
there was little that could be done to mitigate their damage, as “there was no scientific reason to
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fear the infected.”434 It was not until the European Enlightenment of the eighteenth century that
scientific discovery and innovation began to provide solutions for controlling infectious disease
outbreaks. In 1762, Austrian physician Marcus Antonius von Plenciz published a book in which
he outlined a Germ theory of disease; yet it took another century for his theory to become widely
accepted. At the turn of the nineteenth century, the first vaccine was developed. Only in the past
three centuries have scientists managed to develop vaccines, antibiotics, and other therapeutic
treatments to combat a range of infectious diseases that were previously considered deadly.
“The great triumph of our species,” stressed Harper, “is the control of infectious diseases.”435 As
a society, we have clung to a “persistent illusion of control”436 of infectious disease, as we are
now able to prevent and treat many infectious diseases that afflicted mankind in previous
decades and centuries. Yet, as evidenced by the emergence of a “terrifying roster” of infectious
diseases, ranging from HIV and Ebola to West Nile and SARs, “nature’s creative destruction is
far from spent,” wrote Harper in 2018.437
Then came COVID-19. Scientists are still learning about the ways in which the virus
spreads and affects the human body. In the absence of an effective vaccine or treatment, we are
currently living through a pandemic which we cannot yet prevent or cure. At this juncture, it
may be tempting to look to the experiences of the ancient Greeks and Romans for insight. There
are significant commonalities between the consequences of COVID-19 and the four major
ancient epidemics, including anxiety surrounding the unknown, social upheaval, economic
decline, and the exacerbation of racial and socioeconomic inequalities.
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Outbreaks of infectious disease have been, and likely will continue to be, inevitable.
Modern technology, international travel, global supply chains, urbanization, and population
growth may even exacerbate the speed and extent of their spread. But, compared to people
living in ancient times, we are in a much better position today to contend with these pathogens,
pernicious as they may be. DNA sequencing and international collaboration among scientists
enabled identification of the virus responsible for the current outbreak in record time and will—
hopefully—speed the development of multiple vaccines, anti-virals, and other treatments to
combat this and any future outbreaks. Modern medicine has helped, and will continue to help,
many infected individuals to survive and recover. Unlike the ancient Greeks and Romans, we
have the tools to determine how a given disease is transmitted, and what measures (e.g., face
masks and social distancing) are needed to mitigate its spread.
Mark Twain once wrote that “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” But with
the tools at our disposal, in the case of COVID-19, history need not repeat itself—or even rhyme.
The mortality rate of COVID-19 (estimated to be somewhere between 3-4%)438 pales in
comparison to the mortality rates of ancient pandemics (approximately 10-80%). While it is
premature to attempt to predict the long-term economic, social, and religious consequences of
the current pandemic, given the unique advantage we have over our ancestors—knowledge in
medicine, genetics, and epidemiology—there’s reason to be optimistic that the current pandemic
will be less consequential than these ancient pandemics, as long as political leaders and citizens
alike are willing to follow the advice of scientists.
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